JUNE 2013
Risk Management of Enterprise Mobility
Including Bring Your Own Device
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Executive Summary – Introduction to Enterprise Mobility ....................................................................................... 1
Potential Benefits of Enterprise Mobility .................................................................................................................. 2
Potential Benefits of Using Personally Owned Devices............................................................................................. 2
Develop an Enterprise Mobility Strategy................................................................................................................... 3
Determine the Extent of Existing Enterprise Mobility............................................................................................... 3
Develop Business Cases With Suitable Mobility Approaches.................................................................................... 3
Example Business Cases ........................................................................................................................................ 3
Example Enterprise Mobility Approaches and Scenarios ...................................................................................... 4
Considerations for Choosing Enterprise Mobility Approaches ............................................................................. 6
Identify Regulatory Obligations and Legislation........................................................................................................ 7
Allocate Budget and Personnel Resources ................................................................................................................ 8
Develop and Communicate Enterprise Mobility Policy............................................................................................. 9
Technical Support ................................................................................................................................................ 10
Financial Support ................................................................................................................................................. 11
Monitor the Implementation and Report to Management .................................................................................... 12
Facilitate Organisational Transformation................................................................................................................ 12
Further Information................................................................................................................................................. 12
Contact Details......................................................................................................................................................... 13
Appendix A: Arbitrary Unmanaged Devices for Internet Access............................................................................. 14
Corporately Enforced Risk Management Controls .............................................................................................. 15
Filtered and Monitored Network Traffic ......................................................................................................... 15
Separation Between the Organisation’s Corporate Network and the Guest Wi‐Fi Network.......................... 15
Corporate Workstations Configured to Block Access to Unauthorised Devices ............................................. 15
User‐reliant Risk Management Controls ............................................................................................................. 15
Anti‐malware Software.................................................................................................................................... 15
Avoid Behaviour that is Unauthorised, Excessive, Offensive or Unlawful ...................................................... 16
Appendix B: Arbitrary Unmanaged Devices for Non‐sensitive Data ....................................................................... 17
Corporately Enforced Risk Management Controls .............................................................................................. 17
Segmentation and Segregation Between Devices and Organisational Systems ............................................. 17
Web Application and Operating System Vulnerability Assessment and Security Hardening ......................... 17
ii
Appendix C: Corporately Approved and Partially Managed Devices for Sensitive Data ......................................... 18
Corporately Enforced Risk Management Controls .............................................................................................. 19
Overview of Managed Separation, Remote Virtual Desktop and Mobile Device Management..................... 19
Managed Separation ....................................................................................................................................... 22
Remote Virtual Desktop Software................................................................................................................... 22
Mobile Device Management ........................................................................................................................... 25
Multi‐factor Authentication ............................................................................................................................ 26
Encryption of Data in Transit ........................................................................................................................... 27
Remote Tracking, Locking and Wiping ............................................................................................................ 27
Low Privileged Corporate User Accounts ........................................................................................................ 27
Network Architecture Controlling Access to Organisational Data and Systems ............................................. 28
Operating System Exploit Mitigation Mechanisms ......................................................................................... 29
User‐reliant Risk Management Controls ............................................................................................................. 29
Regular Backups of Work Data ........................................................................................................................ 29
Access to Emails, Files and Other Data of Archival Significance...................................................................... 29
Avoid Unauthorised Cloud Services for Data Backup, Storage or Sharing ...................................................... 30
Strong Passphrase Configuration Settings....................................................................................................... 30
Security Incident Reporting and Investigation ................................................................................................ 31
Avoid Jailbreaking and Rooting ....................................................................................................................... 31
Employee Education to Avoid Physical Connectivity with Untrusted Outlets or Devices............................... 31
Employee Education about Bluetooth, Near Field Communication and Quick Response Codes ................... 32
Employee Education to Avoid Installing Potentially Malicious Applications................................................... 32
Employee Education to Avoid Being Victims of Shoulder Surfing ................................................................... 33
Employee Education to Avoid Common Intrusion Vectors ............................................................................. 33
Security Patches............................................................................................................................................... 34
Ownership of Intellectual Property and Copyright.......................................................................................... 35
Encryption of Data at Rest............................................................................................................................... 35
Avoid Printing via Untrusted Systems ............................................................................................................. 36
Personal Firewall ............................................................................................................................................. 36
Appendix D: Corporately Approved and Managed Devices for Highly Sensitive Data............................................ 37
Corporately Enforced Risk Management Controls .............................................................................................. 37
Device Selection............................................................................................................................................... 38
Mobile Application Management and Enterprise Application Stores............................................................. 38
iii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY – INTRODUCTION TO ENTERPRISE MOBILITY
Enterprise mobility enables employees to perform work in specified business‐case scenarios using devices such
as smartphones, tablets and laptops, while leveraging technologies that facilitate remote access to data. A well
designed enterprise mobility strategy can create opportunities for organisations to securely improve customer
service delivery, business efficiency and productivity. In addition, employees obtain increased flexibility to
perform work regardless of their physical location.
This document is developed by the Australian Signals Directorate (ASD), also known as the Defence Signals
Directorate (DSD), to provide senior business representatives with a list of enterprise mobility considerations.
These include business cases, regulatory obligations and legislation, available budget and personnel resources,
and risk tolerance. Additionally, risk management controls are provided for cyber security practitioners.
This document aims to assist readers to understand and help mitigate the significant risks associated with using
devices for work‐related purposes that have the potential to expose sensitive data. Risks are primarily due to
the likelihood of devices storing unprotected sensitive data being lost or stolen 1 , use of corporately unapproved
applications and cloud services to handle sensitive data, inadequate separation between work‐related use and
personal use of a device, and the organisation having reduced assurance in the integrity and security posture of
devices that are not corporately managed. Additional risks arise due to legal liability, regulatory obligations and
legislation requiring compliance, and the implications for the organisation’s budget and personnel resources.
Risks can be partially mitigated through a policy outlining the permitted use of devices, including the required
behaviour expected from employees, which is complemented by technical risk management controls to enforce
the policy and detect violations.
Business cases for enterprise mobility that involve accessing non‐sensitive data might permit employees to use
their personally owned devices, referred to as Bring Your Own Device (BYOD).
Business cases for enterprise mobility that involve accessing and potentially storing sensitive data might permit
employees to use devices that are listed on a corporately approved shortlist of devices. Such devices are
partially or completely corporately managed to enforce policy and technical risk management controls. These
controls can include preventing unapproved applications from running and accessing sensitive data, applying
patches to applications and operating systems in a timely manner, and limiting the ability of employees to use
devices that are “jailbroken”, “rooted” or otherwise run with administrative privileges 2 . Optionally, some
organisations might provide devices to employees, permit a reasonable degree of personal use, and retain
ownership of the devices for legal reasons that facilitate the organisation monitoring devices, remotely wiping
sensitive data, performing security and legal investigations, and retaining ownership of intellectual property.
Before implementing enterprise mobility for a specific business case, organisations must decide whether
applying the chosen risk management controls would result in an acceptable level of residual risk.
1
http://www.amta.org.au/pages/amta/The.Mobile.Phone.Industry.Statement
2
http://www.dsd.gov.au/infosec/top35mitigationstrategies.htm
1
POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF ENTERPRISE MOBILITY
Potential benefits of enterprise mobility include:
improved customer service delivery, business efficiency and productivity, especially for employees who
work out of the office, are field agents, or who travel frequently
improved productivity that is independent of an employee’s physical location, and provides employees
with the opportunity to be productive when otherwise idle such as when travelling on public transport
enabling the recruitment of talented people from anywhere in the world who don’t want to relocate to
the city of the organisation’s office
flexible working hours enabling employees to blend personal time and professional time to achieve an
integrated work‐life balance
opportunities to transition employees on extended leave back into the workplace sooner by working
part‐time from home
reduced costs of real estate, building operations and building maintenance if employees hot‐desk and
are encouraged to work out of the office
business continuity if employees are unable to work in the office, for example due to an air conditioning
failure, power outage, public transport strike, flood, fire or other event
environmental benefits such as reduced commuting to the office and reduced use of printed paper.
POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF USING PERSONALLY OWNED DEVICES
Potential benefits of using personally owned devices for enterprise mobility include:
reduced hardware costs for the organisation if employees pay for their device – an increasing number of
employees already own powerful devices and employees might take better care of a device if they
contribute their own money towards it
freedom for employees to use devices that they prefer, are familiar with and have tailored to their
usage preferences to increase their productivity
negating the need for employees to carry a device for work use and another device for personal use
improved employee job satisfaction, staff retention and recruitment of staff who desire the ability to
use their own device
leveraging modern technologies that empower employees to innovate faster and develop more efficient
ways to do their job, by taking advantage of employees who refresh their software and hardware more
regularly than organisations that provide outdated IT capability that is refreshed every 3‐5 years.
2
DEVELOP AN ENTERPRISE MOBILITY STRATEGY
Developing an enterprise mobility strategy is fundamentally important to an organisation successfully
implementing enterprise mobility to achieve business outcomes with an acceptable level of risk. In the absence
of a strategy, the organisation’s mobility might be driven by employees, without clear measures of success and
without adequate consideration of risks.
An enterprise mobility strategy might involve starting with a pilot trial consisting of a small number of users and
a business case that is low risk, high value and has clear measures of success. Subsequently reviewing the
success of the trial, including the costs and the impact to the organisation’s security posture, enables the
organisation to make an informed decision as to whether to increase their use of enterprise mobility.
The following sections in this document provide guidance for the steps associated with implementing the
enterprise mobility strategy that the organisation has developed.
DETERMINE THE EXTENT OF EXISTING ENTERPRISE MOBILITY
The extent of existing authorised and unauthorised enterprise mobility can be informed by talking to business
representatives and employees, reviewing the organisation’s asset inventory of assigned devices, and using
security controls to detect:
rogue Wi‐Fi access points located on the organisation’s premises
unauthorised devices accessing the corporate network or accessing the Internet via the organisation’s
network infrastructure
employees obtaining a copy of organisational data via removable storage media, email or cloud services.
DEVELOP BUSINESS CASES WITH SUITABLE MOBILITY APPROACHES
Justified business cases for enterprise mobility have tangible and measured benefits to the organisation, its
employees and customers. These benefits outweigh the risks and costs to the organisation. Clearly defining each
business case, including specifying what organisational data needs to be accessed, provides a better
understanding of the opportunities and benefits versus the risks and costs to the organisation.
Example Business Cases
Organisations developing enterprise mobility business cases might decide to permit employees to:
collaborate with other employees via instant messaging or video conferencing
use work‐related software including applications developed by the organisation
send, receive and print work‐related emails with file attachments
3
access, develop, print, store and share work‐related files that reside in data repositories such as
SharePoint, network shares or enterprise grade cloud storage
access calendars, contacts, intranet websites and intranet web applications
access the Internet using the organisation’s network infrastructure.
Example Enterprise Mobility Approaches and Scenarios
An example enterprise mobility implementation might involve a combination of the following approaches.
Scenario A: This scenario involves using devices with a hardware model and operating system version that:
is arbitrarily chosen by the employee
has minimal risk management controls applied – further details are provided in Appendix A
is corporately unmanaged
is used to access the Internet via the organisation’s network infrastructure.
Scenario B: This scenario involves using devices with a hardware model and operating system version that:
is arbitrarily chosen by the employee
has minimal risk management controls applied – further details are provided in Appendix B
is corporately unmanaged
is used to access non‐sensitive data.
For Australian government agencies, non‐sensitive data is defined for the purpose of this document as data that
is unclassified. Examples of non‐sensitive data are unclassified computer based training courses and unclassified
intranet web applications.
Scenario C: This scenario involves using devices with a hardware model and operating system version that:
is chosen by the employee from a corporately approved shortlist
has moderate risk management controls applied – further details are provided in Appendix C
uses corporately managed separation of organisational data and personal data, for example using
remote virtual desktop software, a managed container or partitioning functionality built into the
operating system
uses a corporately managed mechanism to access and potentially store sensitive data, for example using
remote virtual desktop software or corporately approved native applications combined with a Virtual
Private Network.
4
For Australian government agencies, sensitive data is defined for the purpose of this document as data that is
unclassified with dissemination limiting markers such as For Official Use Only (FOUO), Sensitive, Sensitive:Legal
or Sensitive:Personal. Examples of sensitive data are corporate emails, calendars and contacts, as well as files
residing in SharePoint, network shares or enterprise grade cloud storage.
Devices in this scenario might be provided to employees by the organisation, with a reasonable degree of
personal use permitted. Organisations might retain ownership of devices for legal reasons that facilitate the
organisation monitoring devices, remotely wiping sensitive data, performing security and legal investigations,
and retaining ownership of intellectual property. Enabling employees to choose a device from a corporately
approved shortlist is referred to by some vendors as Choose Your Own Device, especially if the device is
purchased, owned and managed by the organisation.
Scenario D: This scenario involves using devices with a hardware model and operating system version that:
is chosen by the employee from a corporately approved shortlist
has comprehensive risk management controls applied – further details are provided in Appendix D
is completely corporately managed, for example using ASD evaluated BlackBerry Enterprise Server 3 or
Apple Configuration Profiles combined with Supervised Mode 4
potentially includes corporately managed separation of organisational data and personal data, for
example using remote virtual desktop software, a managed container or partitioning functionality built
into the operating system
uses a corporately managed mechanism to access and potentially store highly sensitive data, for
example using remote virtual desktop software or corporately approved native applications combined
with a Virtual Private Network.
For Australian government agencies, highly sensitive data is defined for the purpose of this document as data up
to PROTECTED.
The comprehensive risk management controls might restrict the device’s functionality to an extent that would
overly frustrate an employee using a personally owned device. Therefore, devices in this scenario might be
provided to employees by the organisation, with a reasonable degree of personal use permitted. Devices on the
shortlist might be limited to smartphones and tablets that are part of a single vendor’s ecosystem due to the
required compatibility with risk management controls. Organisations might retain ownership of devices for legal
reasons that facilitate the organisation monitoring devices, remotely wiping sensitive data, performing security
and legal investigations, and retaining ownership of intellectual property. Enabling employees to choose a
device from a corporately approved shortlist is referred to by some vendors as Choose Your Own Device,
especially if the device is purchased, owned and managed by the organisation.
3
http://www.dsd.gov.au/infosec/epl/index_details.php?product_id=MTE2IyMjMjAzLjYuNjkuMg==
4
http://www.dsd.gov.au/publications/iOS5_Hardening_Guide.pdf
5
Considerations for Choosing Enterprise Mobility Approaches
When selecting an enterprise mobility approach for a particular business case, consider the employee’s job role,
the sensitivity of the data to be accessed, risk management controls and their impact to employee privacy and
user experience. Also consider whether the level of residual risk is acceptable to the organisation, and costs to
the organisation such as the level of technical support and financial support provided to employees.
These considerations are represented in Figure 1 which reflects the example enterprise mobility scenarios
mentioned previously. Detailed risk management controls for each enterprise mobility scenario are provided in
the appendices of this document.
High
Scenario D
Corporately managed and approved
device model and OS, to access/store
highly sensitive data, potentially
separating personal and work data
Scenario C
Corporately approved device model
and OS, with corporately managed
access/storage for sensitive data,
separating personal and work data
Scenario B
Corporately unmanaged arbitrary
device model and OS, to access non‐
sensitive data
Low
Security Posture, User Experience Impact, Technical and Financial Support
Characteristics of Example Enterprise Mobility Scenarios
Scenario A
Corporately unmanaged arbitrary
device model and OS, to access the
Internet via the organisation’s network
Employee
Organisation
Degree of Device Ownership
Figure 1. Example enterprise mobility scenarios vary in their suitability to handle
sensitive data, their cost and their impact to the employee’s user experience.
6
IDENTIFY REGULATORY OBLIGATIONS AND LEGISLATION
ASD develops and publishes the Australian Government Information Security Manual (ISM) 5 . The ISM advises
that legal advice must be obtained before allowing personally owned devices to connect to organisational
systems.
Neither the ISM nor this document are to be considered as legal advice. An organisation’s legal representatives
must determine to what extent enterprise mobility can be used based on regulatory obligations and legislation
affecting their organisation. Relevant legislation includes the Privacy Act 1988, the Privacy Amendment
(Enhancing Privacy Protection) Act 2012 6 , state and territory privacy laws including Acts covering surveillance of
employees 7 , the Archives Act 1983 and the Freedom of Information Act 1982. Organisations need to maintain an
awareness of relevant legislation and address any associated impacts to their organisation.
Aspects of enterprise mobility requiring legal advice might include:
whether the organisation is permitted to monitor devices and network traffic to identify policy
violations and other security incidents
whether the organisation is permitted to monitor the use of personally owned devices outside of the
organisation’s premises, including remotely locating and tracking a device’s location based on the
device’s GPS coordinates, nearby mobile cell towers or the location of nearby known Wi‐Fi networks
whether the organisation is permitted to access personal data stored on a device when performing a
security or legal investigation – personal data includes emails, history of websites accessed, calendar,
contacts and photos, as well as personal data stored in the employee’s personal consumer grade
webmail or cloud storage account
what action an organisation should take if violations of civil law or criminal law are accidentally
discovered while analysing an employee’s device or network traffic
insurance and liability for compensation, repair or replacement of an employee’s device that is lost,
stolen, compromised with malware or is otherwise damaged and potentially causes injury – such
damage might occur through no fault of the employee’s including while using the device in the office for
work‐related purposes
legal liability resulting from an organisation remotely wiping personal data 8 , especially if the device is
owned by someone who has not provided written consent, such as the estate of a deceased employee
5
http://www.dsd.gov.au/infosec/ism/index.htm
6
http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy‐portal/resources_privacy/Privacy_law_reform.html
7
http://www.privacy.gov.au/law/states
8
http://www.npr.org/2010/11/22/131511381/wipeout‐when‐your‐company‐kills‐your‐iphone
7
legal liability resulting from devices spreading malware or otherwise harming other computers
legal liability to the organisation resulting from employees having or transferring to organisational
systems any software or data that is pirated, infringing copyright or is inappropriately licenced 9
whether the organisation or the employee owns the intellectual property and copyright of work that is
performed on an employee’s device, especially if performed outside of traditional business hours.
ALLOCATE BUDGET AND PERSONNEL RESOURCES
Organisations implementing enterprise mobility might encounter a variety of costs such as:
9
subsidising or completely paying for the cost of devices and associated work‐related expenses
responding to security breaches, policy violations and regulatory compliance violations
personnel resources needed from a variety of sections across the organisation to collaboratively
develop the enterprise mobility strategy and associated policies
implementing risk management controls such as licencing security software and user education
upgrading the organisation’s IT infrastructure including the Wi‐Fi network 10 , Internet bandwidth, as well
as the data centre’s network, storage and server processing capacity
cyber security personnel to architect the IT infrastructure and perform ongoing device management,
monitoring and reporting
additional software Client Access Licences for Microsoft Windows server and client operating systems as
well as for Microsoft Office, especially if the organisation pays for software licences per device instead
of per user
training IT help desk staff to support a variety of devices – at a minimum providing employees with
configuration settings and basic training to connect to permitted organisational networks and systems
modifying intranet websites and web applications to support a variety of web browsers
enhancing identity and access management infrastructure to perform authentication and authorisation
of employees and devices
developing mobile web applications or native software applications to interact with organisational data,
potentially requiring the use of middleware solutions enabling access to data storage repositories.
http://www.zdnet.com/au/byod‐could‐open‐businesses‐to‐copyright‐litigation‐bsa‐7000010533/
10
http://www.dsd.gov.au/publications/csocprotect/wireless_network_security_tech_advice.htm
8
DEVELOP AND COMMUNICATE ENTERPRISE MOBILITY POLICY
ASD’s ISM advises that enterprise mobility policy must be developed to govern the use of devices accessing
organisational data.
Policy relies on user adherence and is likely to be more effective if it exhibits the following characteristics:
offers enterprise mobility as opt‐in instead of mandatory, unless the organisation is willing to
completely pay for the cost of devices and associated work‐related costs
is jointly developed by an advisory board consisting of stakeholders including the cyber security team,
system and network administrators, human resources, finance, legal, senior management and
employees – this consultative process helps to ensure that stakeholders have had input, are willing to
adhere to the policy and accept any additional responsibilities to protect organisational data
clearly states what types of organisational data are permitted to be accessed from which devices and
which applications – the absence of an application strategy might result in employees using applications
that haven’t been vetted by the organisation to determine their potential to expose sensitive data
clearly states how organisational data is permitted to be stored and distributed, for example using
corporately managed data repositories such as SharePoint, network shares or enterprise grade cloud
storage, while avoiding the use of consumer grade cloud storage and personal consumer grade webmail
clearly states which risk management controls apply and deters employees from circumventing these
controls by helping employees to understand why policy rules exist
requires employees to sign an Acceptable Use Policy that clearly states the required behaviour expected
from employees and the consequences of violations
is communicated throughout the organisation to enable employees to understand their obligations and
the policy, to ensure full awareness of the existence of the policy and ramifications of non‐compliance –
the organisation needs to determine which business representatives are responsible for remediating
non‐compliance, which is complemented by a documented dispute escalation and resolution process
is complemented by technical risk management controls to enforce the policy and detect violations,
especially in cases where an employee dishonours their written agreement to adhere to the policy
minimises negative impacts to the employee’s user experience – negative impacts include requiring a
very complex unlock passphrase, automatically locking a device’s screen after a very short idle timeout
period, excessively limiting a device’s functionality, and deleting personal data when wiping an entire
device remotely or after a very small number of consecutive incorrect unlock passphrase attempts
states the technical support and financial support that employees can obtain
9
documents the on‐boarding process for employees to obtain signed approval from their manager,
register their device, have the organisational policy applied, and potentially have software installed on
their device to assist the organisation to configure and manage the device
documents the off‐boarding process to remove organisational software and data from devices that are
lost, stolen or de‐provisioned including when employees cease employment
provides a business representative point of contact in case employees have feedback about the policy
is reviewed and refined if necessary, initially on a quarterly basis while enterprise mobility is still new to
the organisation, and then on an annual basis.
Surveying employees can help reveal whether they would be willing to accept the policy and participate in
enterprise mobility business cases, noting that some employees might perceive that:
costs will be shifted from the organisation to them
their privacy will be invaded
the functionality of their device will be excessively limited
personal data stored on their device will be deleted or exposed
they will be expected to be on call to answer emails and phone calls at all times outside of traditional
business hours.
Technical Support
It is impractical for an organisation’s IT help desk to support devices from a large variety of manufacturers
running a large variety of operating systems with a large variety of configuration settings. Therefore, the
amount of technical support provided to employees depends on the organisation’s personnel resources,
whether devices are listed on a corporately approved shortlist of devices, and the degree to which devices are
necessary for employees to perform their job. Technical support might include:
providing guests, contractors and other employees with details of how to connect to the organisation’s
guest Wi‐Fi network to access the Internet
providing employees with details of how to connect to permitted organisational networks and systems,
and the organisation obtaining visibility of security incidents that place the organisation’s data at risk
providing an internal self‐service “community support” web forum enabling employees to assist each
other, with the IT help desk advertising the existence of the internal web forum and occasionally
contributing to web forum discussions to answer frequently asked questions – an internal web forum
helps to mitigate the risk of employees disclosing details about the organisation’s network
infrastructure configuration when seeking assistance on publicly visible Internet forums
10
providing employees with as much technical support as the IT help desk is capable of, including a short
term loan of a device to keep an employee productive while they get their damaged device repaired
providing employees with full technical support, including replacing damaged or broken devices.
Financial Support
Financial support might have Fringe Benefit Tax implications due to the organisation paying for a device or
Internet and telecommunications connectivity that is used for personal use, especially outside of business
hours 11 . The amount of financial support provided to employees depends on the organisation’s financial
resources and the degree to which devices are necessary for employees to perform their job. Financial support
might include:
acknowledging work‐related costs incurred in support of employees making tax deductible claims
providing employees with a taxable allowance or stipend, or otherwise subsidising or reimbursing the
cost of a device, contractually obligating employees to repay a pro‐rata portion if they cease
employment within a set time period
providing employees with a device that is completely paid for by the organisation, contractually
obligating employees to return the device if they cease employment within a set time period or if the
organisation retains ownership of the device
providing employees with reimbursement for the work‐related portion of the monthly bill from the
employee’s telecommunications carrier and Internet Service Provider, noting that rates associated with
a consumer plan might be higher than rates associated with a corporate plan
providing employees with a corporate SIM card or otherwise arranging Internet and
telecommunications connectivity via a corporate plan, using an automated process to recover the
employee’s portion of the monthly bill via payroll based on criteria that indicate personal use –
expensive data roaming charges for employees travelling overseas can be mitigated by providing
employees with a prepaid SIM card associated with a telecommunications carrier in the foreign country,
or by disabling data roaming via Mobile Device Management to only allow Wi‐Fi data connectivity 12
providing employees with reimbursement for the cost of essential work‐related software, noting that
software licenced to an employee via a consumer licence instead of an enterprise licence is unlikely to
be transferable to a different employee
providing employees with reimbursement for the cost of essential peripherals and accessories.
11
http://www.ato.gov.au/businesses/content.aspx?doc=/content/00167381.htm
12
http://www.zdnet.com/au/telstra‐phone‐theft‐bill‐shock‐shows‐roaming‐still‐broken‐7000008331/
11
MONITOR THE IMPLEMENTATION AND REPORT TO MANAGEMENT
Ongoing monitoring of the enterprise mobility implementation includes reviewing logs from Mobile Device
Management and other log sources such as network logs, user authentication logs and security software.
Regular reporting to management helps them to understand and address unacceptable risks, and assess
whether the benefits of enterprise mobility to the organisation justify the risks and costs to the organisation.
Information to report to management includes:
the degree of compliance with regulatory obligations, legislation and organisational policies
the severity and number of policy violations and other security incidents
the names of employees who are regularly involved in policy violations and other security incidents
costs of IT infrastructure including network upgrades, Internet bandwidth, data storage and server
processing capacity
costs of risk management controls
costs of providing employees with technical support and financial support
the names of employees causing an excessive cost burden due to their use of Internet bandwidth, data
storage, technical support or financial support.
FACILITATE ORGANISATIONAL TRANSFORMATION
Organisations might update their business processes to leverage enterprise mobility, potentially even
transforming the organisation to embrace opportunities such as activity‐based working 13 by:
reviewing the success of enterprise mobility pilot trials, including the costs and the impact to the
organisation’s security posture
reviewing and updating the organisation’s enterprise mobility strategy
making an informed decision whether to increase the scope of enterprise mobility to identify and
pursue additional innovative cost‐effective opportunities to improve customer service delivery,
efficiency and productivity with a level of risk that is acceptable to the organisation.
FURTHER INFORMATION
This document complements the advice in ASD’s ISM and relevant guidance available at http://www.dsd.gov.au.
13
http://www.smh.com.au/it‐pro/business‐it/kpmg‐testruns‐future‐workplace‐20121119‐29m1j.html
12
CONTACT DETAILS
Australian government customers with questions regarding this advice should contact ASD Advice and
Assistance at asd.assist@defence.gov.au or by calling 1300 CYBER1 (1300 292 371).
Australian businesses or other private sector organisations seeking further information should contact CERT
Australia at info@cert.gov.au or by calling 1300 172 499.
13
APPENDICES
Using the Appendices
These appendices provide guidance for four different example enterprise mobility implementation scenarios.
APPENDIX A: ARBITRARY UNMANAGED DEVICES FOR INTERNET
ACCESS
This appendix provides guidance to manage risks associated with Scenario A. This scenario involves devices with
a hardware model and operating system version that:
is arbitrarily chosen by the employee
has minimal risk management controls applied
is corporately unmanaged
is used to access the Internet via the organisation’s network infrastructure.
This implementation can enable organisations to apply more stringent web content filtering controls on the
corporate network to reduce the risk of corporate workstations becoming compromised.
High level objectives associated with this example scenario include:
avoid unauthorised access to the organisation’s corporate network to help prevent employees
introducing malware onto organisational systems or exposing sensitive data
mitigate the threat of sensitive work‐related discussions being recorded by Internet telephony, voice
recognition or other voice recording applications
maintain the availability of organisational Internet connectivity at an acceptable cost
reduce the risk of legal liability to the organisation resulting from:
o
compromised devices spreading malware or harming other computers on the Internet
o
employees downloading copyright infringing movies, music or software from the Internet
o
software or data that is pirated, infringing copyright, or used for work‐related purposes even
though it is only licenced for “home use”, “non‐commercial use” or “educational use”
o
employees accessing pornography or other offensive material while in the office, during
working hours, from devices subsidised by the organisation or via the organisation’s network
infrastructure.
14
Corporately Enforced Risk Management Controls
The organisation is able to manage risk by enforcing the following technical controls.
Filtered and Monitored Network Traffic
Implement:
basic Internet web content filtering to block access to known piracy, pornographic and offensive
websites
bandwidth throttling and Quality of Service to prioritise work‐related network traffic
bandwidth quotas per user and per device to prevent employees from using excessive bandwidth
network traffic logging, archiving and monitoring to help identify policy violations and security incidents.
Separation Between the Organisation’s Corporate Network and the Guest Wi‐Fi Network
Separate the organisation’s internal corporate network from the guest Wi‐Fi network that enables corporately
unmanaged and untrustworthy devices to access the Internet.
Corporate Workstations Configured to Block Access to Unauthorised Devices
Configure corporate workstations to block access to unauthorised devices, for example USB devices 14 15 ,
Bluetooth devices, Wi‐Fi access points, mobile hotspots and other devices with 3G/4G connectivity. This helps
mitigate the risk of corporate workstations either exchanging data with unauthorised devices, or tethering to
devices and accessing the Internet via an unmonitored and unfiltered Internet gateway.
User‐reliant Risk Management Controls
The following technical controls and policy controls to manage risk rely on employees complying with policy.
Anti‐malware Software
Obtain written employee agreement to use anti‐malware software which helps mitigate devices being
compromised.
This control is less applicable to devices that use a strong sandbox design, and limit the execution of applications
to only those that are cryptographically signed by a trusted authority and originate from an application
marketplace with a good history of curation to exclude malware 16 .
14
http://www.securelist.com/en/blog/805/Mobile_attacks
15
http://www.dsd.gov.au/videos/cybersense1.htm
16
http://www.apple.com/ipad/business/it‐center/security.html
15
Additional Information
The organisation might offer anti‐malware software free of charge when employees access the Internet via a
captive portal and agree to the policy.
Signature‐based antivirus software is a reactive approach that is unlikely to protect against targeted malware
that the antivirus vendor doesn’t have visibility of. Anti‐malware software extends signature‐based antivirus
software to typically include heuristic detection, identification of applications behaving suspiciously, as well as
reputation checking of applications and websites accessed.
Avoid Behaviour that is Unauthorised, Excessive, Offensive or Unlawful
Obtain written employee agreement to:
17
only access organisational systems or data that they are explicitly permitted to access
avoid sensitive work‐related discussions being recorded by Internet telephony, voice recognition 17 or
other voice recording applications
use organisational Internet connectivity as per existing policy, which might disallow accessing offensive
and copyright infringing content, disallow excessive use of Internet bandwidth for example via personal
use of YouTube, and require employees to accept the risk of their device being compromised
ensure that their device doesn’t contain or transfer to organisational systems any software or data that
is pirated, infringing copyright, or used for work‐related purposes even though it is only licenced for
“home use”, “non‐commercial use” or “educational use”
not deliberately access pornography or other offensive material while in the office, during working
hours, from devices subsidised by the organisation, or via the organisation’s network infrastructure –
Australian Public Service employees are bound by the Australian Public Service Code of Conduct and
Values even when working out of the office using their own device.
http://www.zdnet.com/apple‐stores‐your‐voice‐data‐for‐two‐years‐7000014216/
16
APPENDIX B: ARBITRARY UNMANAGED DEVICES FOR NON‐
SENSITIVE DATA
This appendix provides guidance to manage risks associated with Scenario B. This scenario involves devices with
a hardware model and operating system version that:
is arbitrarily chosen by the employee
has minimal risk management controls applied
is corporately unmanaged
is used to access non‐sensitive data.
For Australian government agencies, non‐sensitive data is defined for the purpose of this document as data that
is unclassified. Examples of non‐sensitive data are unclassified computer based training courses and unclassified
intranet web applications.
This appendix builds upon and incorporates the high level objectives and risk management controls discussed in
Appendix A which covers arbitrary corporately unmanaged devices used to access the Internet via the
organisation’s network infrastructure. High level objectives associated with the example scenario in Appendix B
also include:
avoid unauthorised access to organisational systems and data
avoid untrustworthy devices compromising organisational systems that are permitted to be accessed.
Corporately Enforced Risk Management Controls
The organisation is able to manage risk by enforcing the following technical controls.
Segmentation and Segregation Between Devices and Organisational Systems
Appropriately architect and segment the organisation’s corporate network using a combination of security
enforcing mechanisms such as firewalls, reverse proxies, Virtual Local Area Networks and Virtual Private
Networks. This helps mitigate devices accessing unauthorised organisational systems and data.
Web Application and Operating System Vulnerability Assessment and Security Hardening
Perform vulnerability assessments and security hardening of web applications and operating systems running on
organisational systems that are permitted to be accessed. This helps mitigate devices compromising
organisational systems and their data.
17
APPENDIX C: CORPORATELY APPROVED AND PARTIALLY MANAGED
DEVICES FOR SENSITIVE DATA
This appendix provides guidance to manage risks associated with Scenario C. This scenario involves devices with
a hardware model and operating system version that:
is chosen by the employee from a corporately approved shortlist
has moderate risk management controls applied
uses corporately managed separation of organisational data and personal data, for example using
remote virtual desktop software, a managed container or partitioning functionality built into the
operating system
uses a corporately managed mechanism to access and potentially store sensitive data, for example using
remote virtual desktop software or corporately approved native applications combined with a Virtual
Private Network.
For Australian government agencies, sensitive data is defined for the purpose of this document as data that is
unclassified with dissemination limiting markers such as For Official Use Only (FOUO), Sensitive, Sensitive:Legal
or Sensitive:Personal. Examples of sensitive data are corporate emails, calendars and contacts, as well as files
residing in SharePoint, network shares or enterprise grade cloud storage.
Devices in this scenario might be provided to employees by the organisation, with a reasonable degree of
personal use permitted. Organisations might retain ownership of devices for legal reasons that facilitate the
organisation monitoring devices, remotely wiping sensitive data, performing security and legal investigations,
and retaining ownership of intellectual property. Enabling employees to choose a device from a corporately
approved shortlist is referred to by some vendors as Choose Your Own Device, especially if the device is
purchased, owned and managed by the organisation.
This appendix builds upon and incorporates the high level objectives and risk management controls discussed in
Appendix B which covers arbitrary corporately unmanaged devices used to access non‐sensitive data. High level
objectives associated with the example scenario in Appendix C also include:
protect the organisation’s financial investment in the cost of devices
maintain the availability and integrity of organisational data for business continuity
maintain the confidentiality of sensitive data
maintain corporate ownership of organisational data created by employees using their device
rapidly respond to policy violations, data spills and other security incidents
be able to perform electronic discovery for litigation cases and freedom of information requests.
18
Some of the risk management controls described in this appendix might be unnecessary or impractical
depending on the organisation’s business case, the sensitivity of data accessed by devices, the use of other risk
management controls, and the type of device noting that some controls focus primarily on smartphones and
tablets rather than laptops.
An example shortlist of devices from which employees can choose is a smartphone or tablet device running:
iOS version 5.1 or later 18
BlackBerry version 5 or later
Windows version 8 or later
Android version 4 or later running on devices from specifically named hardware manufacturers with a
history of distributing security updates in a timely manner.
The shortlist of devices is regularly updated to reflect newly available devices on the market and is limited to
only devices that:
are compatible with required business applications developed by the organisation and by third parties
the organisation has the technical knowledge to support, resulting in more predictable support costs
meet minimum requirements specified by the organisation, including compatibility with the
organisation’s chosen risk management controls such as Mobile Device Management as well as
managed separation mechanisms such as managed containers
provide the organisation with adequate assurance of the device’s ability to appropriately protect
sensitive data
comply with Australian legislation 19 and are covered by Australian warranties.
Corporately Enforced Risk Management Controls
The organisation is able to manage risk by enforcing the following technical controls.
Overview of Managed Separation, Remote Virtual Desktop and Mobile Device Management
ASD’s ISM advises that devices without ASD approved encryption should not store unclassified FOUO/Sensitive
data and must not store classified data. Additionally, ASD’s ISM advises that employees should be prevented
from installing unapproved applications that can access unclassified FOUO/Sensitive data or classified data.
18
Mention of any vendor product is for illustrative purposes only and does not imply ASD’s endorsement of the product. All
trademarks are the property of their respective owners.
19
http://www.acma.gov.au/webwr/_assets/main/lib310037/summary%20of%20labelling%20requirements%20‐%20fs89.pdf
19
Risk management controls used to follow this guidance include using managed separation such as an encrypted
managed container, preferably combined with Mobile Device Management to provide some basic assurance in
the device’s underlying operating system configuration, or using appropriately configured remote virtual
desktop software. Use of the phrase “remote virtual desktop software” in this document incorporates
virtualised applications and “Virtual Desktop Infrastructure” (VDI).
Organisations might choose to use managed separation for some business cases such as an ASD evaluated
encrypted managed container 20 on evaluated smartphones 21 with small screens, and remote virtual desktop
software for other business cases such as unevaluated devices or devices with large screens.
Detailed information about managed separation, remote virtual desktop software and Mobile Device
Management is provided in the following pages of this appendix. Figure 2 shows the comparative ability of these
risk management controls to protect organisational data and their negative impact to the employee’s user
experience. All of the implementations shown include basic risk management controls such as applying vendor
security patches in a timely manner, using up‐to‐date anti‐malware software and performing backups of work
data to backup servers specified by the organisation. These risk management controls won’t prevent a malicious
employee from copying organisational data by taking a screenshot or photograph of their device’s screen.
20
http://www.dsd.gov.au/infosec/epl/index_details.php?product_id=MzA5IyMjMjAzLjYuNjkuMg==
21
http://www.dsd.gov.au/infosec/epl/
20
High
(e.g. PROTECTED data)
Tradeoff of Risk Management Controls Between Security and User Impact
Device running software
and crypto evaluated by
ASD, configured as per
ASD’s hardening guide,
and managed by the
organisation
Remote virtual desktop on
a smartphone, with MDM
providing assurance in the
device’s configuration
Ability to Protect Organisational Data
Remote virtual desktop on a tablet,
with Mobile Device Management
(MDM) providing assurance in the
device’s configuration
Managed container with MDM
providing assurance in the
device’s configuration
Remote virtual
desktop on a tablet
Remote virtual desktop
on a smartphone
Low
(e.g. non‐sensitive data)
Managed
container only
MDM only
Unmanaged device using native
applications and storing organisational
data unencrypted on the device
Low
High
Impact to User Experience
Figure 2. Risk management controls vary in their ability to protect organisational
data and their negative impact to the employee’s user experience.
21
Managed Separation
Managed separation helps protect and isolate organisational data stored on devices. Organisational data is
logically separated from the employee’s personal operating environment, limiting the ability of such data to
spread, and facilitating the remote wiping of only organisational data.
Additional Information
There are several different types of separation mechanisms including partitioning functionality built into the
operating system as well as mechanisms bolted on top of the operating system such as managed containers 22 23 .
Emerging technology includes type 1 hypervisors and type 2 hypervisors providing a locally virtualised operating
system 24 . Some separation mechanisms are designed to ensure that organisational data can only be accessed by
applications that have been vetted by the organisation.
Managed containers, type 2 hypervisors or other mechanisms bolted onto the operating system provide
reduced security if there is inadequate assurance in the integrity and security posture of the operating system.
Use of a managed container has the following corporate benefits with associated potential impacts to the
employee’s user experience:
requiring employees to enter an additional passphrase to access organisational data
data encryption that is independent of the encryption provided by a device’s operating system –
software‐based encryption might slow down the device due to cryptographic overhead
reducing the risk of data leakage by restricting employees to use only corporately approved applications
to handle organisational data, while limiting the ability of such applications to copy organisational data
to corporately unapproved cloud services or elsewhere beyond the managed container.
Organisations considering using a managed container need to determine whether the vendor has access to
organisational data or cryptographic keys used to decrypt organisational data.
Remote Virtual Desktop Software
Appropriately configured remote virtual desktop software helps keep organisational data in the organisation’s
data centre and not stored on devices, while still enabling employees to access organisational data and
applications.
Additional Information
22
http://www.dsd.gov.au/infosec/epl/view_document.php?document_id=OTUxIyMjMjAzLjYuNjkuMg==
23
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2013/03/14/blackberry_secure/
24
http://computerworld.com/s/article/print/9233834/Dual_identity_smartphones_could_bridge_BYOD_private_corporate_divide
22
ASD’s ISM advises that unclassified FOUO/Sensitive data or classified data exchanged during the entire remote
virtual desktop session must be encrypted using ASD approved encryption.
ASD’s experience is that remote virtual desktop software does not necessarily keep organisational data in the
data centre or prevent such data being transferred to and from devices. Some remote virtual desktop software
contains functionality to deliberately enable organisational data to be copied to and from devices, including the
ability for malware on devices to be introduced into the remote virtual desktop as shown in Figure 3 below.
Figure 3. In this example, an employee is accessing their Android device’s file system and
removable media from within the remote virtual desktop running Microsoft Windows. The
employee is able to copy organisational data to their device, and introduce malware into
the remote virtual desktop. This employee behaviour results in a less stringent audit trail
than if email was used to extract organisational data or to introduce malware.
23
There are a variety of ways in which organisational data might leak out of the remote virtual desktop and be
stored unprotected on devices. Risk management controls to help mitigate such data leakage include:
appropriately configuring remote virtual desktop software running on the server and on the device to
help mitigate the employee printing to local printers, printing to local files, accessing their device’s file
system and removable media from within the remote virtual desktop, and using the clipboard to copy
and paste data in both directions between the remote virtual desktop and the device
using full device encryption to help protect organisational data that might inadvertently be stored on
the device, especially if the device is a laptop due to the possibility of data in memory being written to
disk as part of a page/swap file or hibernation/sleep file
obtaining written agreement from employees to avoid deliberately copying organisational data to their
device and to avoid introducing potential malware from their device into the remote virtual desktop
partially mitigating keystroke logging software and malware that enables an adversary to take
screenshots of the remote virtual desktop by using up‐to‐date anti‐malware software on devices,
ensuring that all vendor security patches are applied to devices as soon as patches are available from
the vendor, and educating employees to avoid installing potentially malicious applications
configuring the remote virtual desktop to lock its screen after a short idle timeout period to help
mitigate an adversary using a compromised device to control the remote virtual desktop’s mouse and
keyboard
disallowing the use of keyboard applications featuring a custom dictionary or predictive text which
capture sensitive words or word combinations typed into the remote virtual desktop and save such
sensitive data on the device’s local file system 25 .
The following impacts of remote virtual desktop software should be considered prior to implementation:
25
the requirement for employees to have reliable Internet connectivity
the impact on the employee’s user experience especially for devices with small screens such as
smartphones – for example, using remote virtual desktop software to turn a smartphone into a dumb
terminal might frustrate employees trying to send an email using Microsoft Outlook running on an older
version of Microsoft Windows that was not designed for a touch interface
the potential requirement for the organisation to upgrade their network and data centre’s storage and
server processing capacity
the potential requirement for the organisation to purchase additional Client Access Licences for
Microsoft Windows server and client operating systems as well as for Microsoft Office.
http://support.swiftkey.net/knowledgebase/articles/9101‐swiftkey‐is‐predicting‐my‐password‐how‐do‐i‐stop
24
Mobile Device Management
Mobile Device Management configures and audits devices, including enforcing aspects of the policy such as:
the device enrolment process, which might involve installing software on the device to assist the
organisation to manage the device and a digital certificate to authenticate the device to the network
unlock passphrases having a specified minimum length and required complexity
the device idle timeout period until the device’s screen is automatically locked
the number of consecutive failed passphrase attempts until the device is automatically wiped
the capability to perform remote tracking, locking and wiping of devices
the ability of employees to print to non‐organisational printers
encryption of data at rest and in transit, including Virtual Private Network configuration settings
the ability for employees to use their device’s camera, microphone, Bluetooth, USB interface,
removable media or GPS, particularly while on organisational premises
detecting, reporting and blocking devices that are jailbroken or rooted, noting that detection is not
perfect and relies on an untrusted device to tell the truth about its software 26
endpoint compliance checking including whether patches and anti‐malware software are up to date
disabling the backup of unprotected sensitive data to consumer grade cloud storage such as iCloud,
while still enabling an employee’s personal data to be backed up
configuring appropriate email and Wi‐Fi connectivity settings
disabling inbuilt voice recording applications that send captured voice over the Internet
ongoing device management, monitoring and asset tracking.
Additional Information
ASD’s ISM advises that mobile devices accessing unclassified FOUO/Sensitive data or classified data:
26
should use Mobile Device Management to ensure that organisational policy is applied, enabling
organisations to centrally manage the configuration of devices and audit adherence to policy
must prevent employees from disabling security functions on a device once provisioned
http://www.networkworld.com/news/2010/121010‐apple‐ios‐jailbreak.html
25
should be regularly tested to ensure that devices are still secure, for example that their configuration
aligns with the organisation’s policy and that security updates have been applied on a regular basis.
Using Mobile Device Management to enforce an organisation’s unreasonably strict policy, especially when the
employee is not using their device for work‐related purposes, might negatively affect the employee’s user
experience.
Organisations considering using Mobile Device Management need to determine whether the vendor has access
to sensitive data such as a device’s unlock passphrase.
Multi‐factor Authentication
Multi‐factor authentication helps mitigate an adversary accessing organisational systems by using compromised
employee corporate account credentials 27 .
Additional Information
ASD’s ISM advises that multi‐factor authentication must be used for remote access to government systems.
Employees should log off organisational systems when finished, so that multi‐factor authentication is required
to regain access. Organisational systems should be configured to log users off after an idle timeout period.
A physically separate hardware multi‐factor authentication token with a time‐based value, stored separately to
the employee’s device, can provide greater security than a soft token such as an SMS or software application
that displays an authentication token value on the employee’s device. If the device is compromised 28 29 or if its
SIM card is reissued to an adversary 30 , the employee’s soft token value can be accessed by the adversary,
thereby defeating the multi‐factor authentication mechanism.
Using multi‐factor authentication doesn’t completely mitigate the risk of typing a corporate passphrase into an
untrustworthy device. An adversary might obtain the employee’s corporate passphrase when the employee
types it into a compromised device. The adversary could then use this passphrase during a subsequent intrusion,
for example by either gaining physical access to a corporate workstation and simply logging in as the employee.
Alternatively, the adversary could use a spear phishing email to compromise any employee’s workstation on the
corporate network and use the previously obtained passphrase to access sensitive data on network drives.
To help mitigate this risk, either require multi‐factor authentication for all employee logins including logins to
corporate workstations in the office, or require that corporate passphrases entered by employees into
untrustworthy devices are different to corporate passphrases entered into corporate workstations in the office.
27
http://www.dsd.gov.au/publications/csocprotect/multi_factor_authentication.htm
28
http://www.securitybistro.com/blog/?p=4226
29
http://www.scmagazine.com/zeus‐for‐android‐steals‐one‐time‐banking‐passwords/article/207286/
30
http://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2013/01/20/indian‐two‐factor‐authentication‐fraudsters‐busted‐by‐delhi‐cops/
26
Encryption of Data in Transit
Encrypting data in transit helps mitigate organisational data being accessed by an adversary who has access to a
device’s network communications. Such access might result from the use of a Wi‐Fi access point that is
unencrypted, or the use of any networking infrastructure that is not controlled by the organisation and is
therefore considered untrustworthy.
Additional Information
ASD’s ISM advises that ASD approved encryption must be used to encrypt unclassified FOUO/Sensitive data or
classified data in transit over untrustworthy network infrastructure. For example, data sent over an untrusted
network such as the Internet could be protected by using ASD approved encryption implemented via a Virtual
Private Network or remote virtual desktop software. ASD approved Wi‐Fi Protected Access 2 (WPA2) could be
used for protecting data that only requires protection when exchanged between a device and an organisation’s
Wi‐Fi access point.
ASD’s ISM advises that split tunnelling must be disabled on devices supporting this functionality when accessing
an organisational system via a Virtual Private Network.
Remote Tracking, Locking and Wiping
Remote tracking helps to recover a device that has been lost or stolen.
Remote locking and wiping helps to protect organisational data on a device that has been lost, stolen, or de‐
provisioned including when the employee ceases employment.
Additional Information
The consequences of wiping an employee’s personal data can be reduced by educating employees to regularly
backup their personal data or by using managed separation to avoid wiping personal data in the first place.
Attempting to remotely track, lock or wipe a device that is not network accessible will fail. For example, remote
wipe functionality is circumvented if the thief configures the device for “aeroplane mode”, which can easily be
done from the locked screen of some devices such as a Nexus 7 tablet running Android version 4.2.2 Jelly Bean.
Successfully remotely wiping a device provides the organisation with a false sense of security if the data has
already been accessed or copied by the person who found or stole the device.
Low Privileged Corporate User Accounts
Using corporate user accounts with reduced privileges and limited access to sensitive data helps mitigate an
adversary accessing sensitive data by using compromised employee corporate account credentials or a
compromised device.
Additional Information
ASD’s ISM advises that privileged accounts should not be allowed to remotely access organisational systems
containing unclassified FOUO/Sensitive data or PROTECTED data.
27
Provide a secondary corporate user account, which has reduced privileges and limited access to sensitive data,
to employees who either:
have administrative privileges
have access to significant amounts of sensitive organisational data
are at higher risk, for example due to temporarily travelling overseas 31 – such employees might
temporarily use a separate corporately provided device.
Network Architecture Controlling Access to Organisational Data and Systems
Network Access Control helps to implement contextual security to determine if an employee attempting to
access organisational data should be permitted based on:
the device’s security posture as determined by endpoint compliance checking, including the degree to
which the device is corporately managed
the employee’s identity and the strength of authentication used to prove their identity
the sensitivity of the data being accessed
the destination of the data, for example whether data is to be stored on the device or shared via
corporately managed enterprise cloud storage
the employee’s network connectivity, for example whether the employee’s device is connecting using
the organisation’s Wi‐Fi network or an external less trusted network connection
the geographic location of the employee and the device
the time and day of the week.
Devices that don’t comply with security policy can be quarantined to have limited Internet access but no access
to organisational systems.
Devices simultaneously connecting to the organisation’s network and an additional network via 3G/4G or Wi‐Fi
can bridge the two networks thereby creating an additional Internet gateway on the organisational network.
Risk management controls to help mitigate this include:
31
using Mobile Device Management to configure devices on organisational premises to either force all
device traffic to an organisational Virtual Private Network endpoint, or to turn off a device’s 3G/4G data
connectivity while still allowing phone calls
organisations setting up a custom Access Point Name to control data sent from devices via 3G/4G
http://www.dsd.gov.au/publications/csocprotect/electronic_devices_os_travel.htm
28
forcing devices to use the organisation’s gateway to connect to the organisational network – this also
assists the organisation to use existing gateway mechanisms for logging, auditing, and filtering malicious
or otherwise undesirable network traffic.
The network flow of sensitive data to devices can be limited by using mechanisms such as Enterprise Rights
Management or Data Loss Prevention solutions, for example to prevent a device downloading an email from the
organisation’s email server if the email or attachment contains specific keywords indicating sensitive data.
Operating System Exploit Mitigation Mechanisms
Limit devices on the shortlist to those devices with operating system exploit mitigation mechanisms such as:
Address Space Layout Randomisation 32
Data Execution Prevention
applications and patches that are cryptographically signed by a trusted authority
application sandboxing to compartmentalise applications, restrict their ability to access data stored on
the device, and restrict applications interacting with other applications or the operating system.
User‐reliant Risk Management Controls
The following technical controls and policy controls to manage risk rely on employees complying with policy.
Regular Backups of Work Data
Obtain written employee agreement to regularly backup work‐related data created or modified by their device,
only to backup servers specified by the organisation. This helps mitigate an employee’s work being lost due to
sudden cessation of employment or their device being damaged, lost or stolen.
Access to Emails, Files and Other Data of Archival Significance
Obtain written employee agreement to ensure that work‐related data of archival significance is accessible to the
organisation. This involves employees using their work email account instead of their consumer grade webmail
account, and using corporately managed file storage instead of storing files locally or in consumer grade cloud
storage. This helps mitigate:
32
non‐compliance with legislation such as the Archives Act 1983
corporate knowledge being lost when the employee departs the organisation
the organisation being unable to properly perform security investigations, or perform electronic
discovery for litigation cases or freedom of information requests.
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2012/07/20/android_jelly_bean_security_revamp/
29
Avoid Unauthorised Cloud Services for Data Backup, Storage or Sharing
Obtain written employee agreement to avoid exposing sensitive data to consumer grade cloud services used for
webmail, data backup, data storage or data sharing.
Additional Information
Some consumer grade cloud storage and sharing services automatically sync between an employee’s devices,
potentially copying sensitive data to a device that has not been approved to handle such data.
To facilitate the authorised exchange of data between devices, the organisation might need to arrange
employee access to a corporately managed and remotely accessible file storage and sharing capability, hosted
in‐house or by a trusted third party 33 34 .
Strong Passphrase Configuration Settings
Obtain written employee agreement to use strong passphrases and associated configuration settings.
Obtain written employee agreement to avoid configuring their device’s operating system or applications to
remember organisational authentication credentials such as corporate passphrases used to access
organisational systems.
Additional Information
Recommended device configuration settings, based on the sensitivity of data being accessed or stored, are
provided by ASD’s ISM, device consumer guides and device hardening guides. ASD’s iOS Hardening
Configuration Guide 35 advises the following configuration settings for iOS devices that access or store
PROTECTED data:
passphrases require a minimum of eight characters including alphanumeric characters
devices automatically lock their screen after five minutes of inactivity
a passphrase is always required to unlock the device – there is no grace period enabling a device to be
unlocked without a passphrase if the screen lock activated recently
devices are automatically wiped after five failed passphrase attempts, noting the risk of devices being
accidentally wiped especially if employees allow their device to be played with by children
passphrases have a maximum age of 90 days
the previous eight passphrases are unable to be reused.
33
http://www.dsd.gov.au/infosec/cloudsecurity.htm
34
http://agimo.gov.au/policy‐guides‐procurement/cloud/
35
http://www.dsd.gov.au/publications/iOS5_Hardening_Guide.pdf
30
Security Incident Reporting and Investigation
Obtain written employee agreement to immediately report security incidents and cooperate with security and
legal investigations including providing the organisation with access to their device for forensic analysis.
Additional Information
ASD’s ISM advises that employees must be directed to report security incidents to the organisation as soon as
possible.
Security incidents requiring reporting include a device suspected of being infected with malware or otherwise
compromised, as well as device loss or theft. Additional activities, whilst not necessarily considered to be
security incidents, that need be reported by the employee to the organisation include de‐provisioning a device
for sale or passing to a family member, or if the employee ceases employment.
An organisation’s cyber security team requires plans and procedures to respond to security incidents, for
example disabling and monitoring the employee’s organisational accounts including Virtual Private Network and
remote access accounts, as well as remotely tracking the device and wiping organisational data if appropriate.
Organisations permitting the use of personally owned devices are accepting the residual risks of their use, such
as any potential security incidents or consequences of legal proceedings including electronic discovery for
litigation cases and freedom of information requests. Therefore, organisations need to ensure that they have
risk management controls to prevent and respond to security incidents and legal investigations. Organisations
should not assume that ASD or CERT Australia have the legal authority and resources to assist with performing
incident response or forensic analysis that involves personally owned devices.
A security or legal investigation might require an employee to temporarily surrender their device, which the
employee might refuse unless required by law, for example due to law enforcement having evidence of a crime
to warrant seizing the device. Organisations performing appropriate logging and regular backups of work‐
related emails and files assists with electronic discovery or other investigations involving employees who refuse
to cooperate or who have departed the organisation.
Avoid Jailbreaking and Rooting
Obtain written employee agreement to avoid jailbreaking or rooting their device to circumvent the protective
security controls implemented by the device’s vendor, which might result in the device being unmanageable by
the organisation and easily compromised.
Employee Education to Avoid Physical Connectivity with Untrusted Outlets or Devices
Educate employees to avoid allowing connectivity between their device and either a potentially malicious
charging outlet 36 or an untrusted device 37 .
36
http://krebsonsecurity.com/2011/08/beware‐of‐juice‐jacking/
37
http://www.dsd.gov.au/videos/cybersense1.htm
31
Employee Education about Bluetooth, Near Field Communication and Quick Response Codes
Educate employees to avoid:
pairing with an unintended or insecure Bluetooth device
exchanging data with an untrusted Near Field Communication (NFC) device 38
scanning NFC tags 39 or Quick Response (QR) codes 40 that are untrustworthy and potentially malicious.
Additional Information
ASD’s ISM advises that devices storing or accessing unclassified FOUO/Sensitive data or classified data:
must be configured to remain undiscoverable to all other Bluetooth devices except during pairing
must only connect to the intended Bluetooth device during pairing
must be configured to avoid supporting multiple simultaneous Bluetooth headset connections
must use Bluetooth version 2.1 or later due to the introduction of secure simple pairing and extended
inquiry response which facilitates secure pairing with the desired device – a device’s Bluetooth version
can be determined by reading the product’s specifications or by using the Linux “btscanner” program.
Employee Education to Avoid Installing Potentially Malicious Applications
Educate employees using devices that have an official application marketplace to:
only install applications from the organisation’s enterprise application store or from official application
marketplaces such as Apple’s App Store, Google Play, Microsoft’s Windows Store, Microsoft’s Windows
Phone Store or BlackBerry World
prior to installing or updating an application, determine the risk of exposing sensitive data by reading
user ratings, user reviews and the application’s requested permissions to ensure that they align with the
application’s stated functionality 41 42 – noting that such analysis is not guaranteed to avoid malware 43 .
Educate employees using devices that don’t have an official marketplace to obtain software from the official
website of mainstream vendors.
38
http://www.zdnet.com/exploit‐beamed‐via‐nfc‐to‐hack‐samsung‐galaxy‐s3‐android‐4‐0‐4‐7000004510/
39
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2012/09/25/samsung_flaw/
40
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2012/12/10/qr_code_sticker_scam/
41
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2013/03/04/android_app_google_play_fraud/
42
http://www.securelist.com/en/blog/845/Hello_from_Malaysia
43
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2013/04/22/android_malware_badnews/
32
Employee Education to Avoid Being Victims of Shoulder Surfing
Educate employees to avoid sensitive data on their device’s screen being visible to either:
people without the appropriate security clearance and need to know 44
surveillance video cameras 45
members of the public
anyone, including family members, who are not authorised to see sensitive data.
46
Additional Information
Using a privacy filter on a device’s screen might negatively impact the device’s touch functionality.
Employee Education to Avoid Common Intrusion Vectors
Educate employees to avoid:
sharing their device with unauthorised people who are able to access and expose sensitive data
sending or receiving unencrypted sensitive data using an untrustworthy Wi‐Fi access point, such as a
public Wi‐Fi access point or any Wi‐Fi access point that isn’t owned by the organisation
leaving their device in insecure locations such as an unattended car, checked‐in airplane luggage, or a
hotel safe especially in a foreign country
interacting with emails and SMS messages from suspicious or unfamiliar sources, for example clicking on
hyperlinks or email attachments
selecting weak passphrases
reusing the same passphrase for multiple systems
unnecessarily exposing their work email address and personal details on publicly accessible websites.
Additional Information
ASD’s ISM advises that all personnel who have access to an organisational system must have sufficient
information security awareness and training including an awareness of the social engineering threat.
44
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2012/08/16/shoulder_surfing_security_risk/
45
http://www.engadget.com/2011/07/15/automated‐shoulder‐surfing‐makes‐it‐easier‐to‐steal‐passwords‐i/
46
http://arstechnica.com/security/2013/02/at‐facebook‐zero‐day‐exploits‐backdoor‐code‐bring‐war‐games‐drill‐to‐life/2/
33
Security Patches
Obtain written employee agreement to apply all vendor security patches for the operating system and
applications as soon as patches are available from the vendor.
Additional Information
ASD’s ISM advises that mobile devices permitted to access unclassified FOUO/Sensitive data or classified data
should have security updates applied as soon as vendor patches become available.
Historically, Apple has provided iOS devices with security patches for at least two years from device availability,
enabling employees to use devices supported with patches for the duration of their contract with their
telecommunications carrier.
Microsoft has stated that for Windows Phone 8, they will support every device with over the air updates for at
least 18 months from the launch of that device 47 though the availability of updates will vary 48 . Microsoft’s
lifecycle policy for Windows RT, including the support time period for security updates, is to be communicated
when available 49 .
It is comparatively straightforward to apply security patches to some Android devices that don’t have third party
additions or modifications to baseline Android code 50 . However, applying security patches to other Android
devices might be challenging due to the cooperation required from the device’s hardware manufacturer and the
employee’s telecommunications carrier to tweak, test and distribute updates. Some hardware manufacturers
and telecommunications carriers might focus their efforts on developing and selling newer devices rather than
maintaining the security of the employee’s current device, even if the employee is forced to continue using their
current device due to a contract with the telecommunications carrier 51 . Some devices are immediately
“orphaned” and never receive updates 52 . In addition to vulnerabilities in baseline Android code, some
vulnerabilities are introduced by device hardware manufacturers 53 54 55 .
47
http://channel9.msdn.com/Events/Windows‐Phone/Summit/Updates‐Apps‐and‐closing‐remarks
48
http://support.microsoft.com/lifecycle/search/default.aspx?alpha=windows+phone
49
http://support.microsoft.com/gp/lifecycle‐windows‐rt‐faq
50
http://support.google.com/googleplay/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=2589788
51
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/02/carriers‐fail‐to‐secure‐phones/
52
http://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2012/12/the‐checkered‐slow‐history‐of‐android‐handset‐updates/
53
http://threatpost.com/htc‐settlement‐could‐alter‐mobile‐security‐and‐privacy‐landscape‐022513/
54
http://threatpost.com/vulnerabilities‐continue‐weigh‐down‐samsung‐android‐phones‐032013/
55
http://www.zdnet.com/kernel‐vulnerability‐places‐samsung‐devices‐at‐risk‐7000008862/
34
Some cheaper Android devices have the bare minimum hardware specifications required to run the version of
the operating system shipped with the device, and might not be suited to running newer major versions of the
operating system that require additional memory or processing power. Patching vulnerabilities in the operating
system running on such devices might be challenging for patches that are only available in newer major versions
of the operating system and are not backported to current and previous operating system versions.
Case Study
In 2012, an ASD employee purchased a brand new Android smartphone. The employee subsequently
discovered that on the day the smartphone was sold, it contained a vulnerability that at the time had been
publicly known for over seven months. The smartphone’s hardware manufacturer and the employee’s
telecommunications carrier did not make a patch available.
To demonstrate a targeted intrusion, the smartphone was deliberately compromised by exploiting this
vulnerability. The compromise enabled the microphone to be surreptitiously turned on to record nearby
audio conversations and the recordings to be transmitted to an adversary over the Internet.
This demonstration highlighted some consequences of organisations permitting the use of devices with
publicly known vulnerabilities that the employee is unable to patch. As of May 2013, over 18 months after
the vulnerability was publicly disclosed, a patch hasn’t been made available via the hardware manufacturer
and telecommunications carrier.
Ownership of Intellectual Property and Copyright
Obtain written employee agreement that the organisation retains ownership of intellectual property and
copyright of work performed on a formally assigned task that the employee is paid to perform, regardless of
whether the employee performs the work on their device or outside of traditional business hours.
Encryption of Data at Rest
Obtain written employee agreement to use full device encryption to help mitigate organisational data being
accessed by an adversary who has physical access to a lost or stolen device.
Additional Information
ASD’s ISM advises that devices without ASD approved encryption should not store unclassified FOUO/Sensitive
data and must not store classified data.
ASD’s ISM advises that ASD approved encryption should be used to encrypt a device’s internal storage and any
removable media.
Full device encryption doesn’t limit which applications can access or spread organisational data stored on the
device. Therefore, its effectiveness relies upon the use of additional complementary risk management controls.
Encryption needs to be active when the device is not in use. Depending on the type of device, the effectiveness
of encrypting a device’s internal storage might be reduced if the device is lost or stolen while it is in sleep mode
or powered on and screen locked.
35
Using software‐based encryption might negatively impact the employee’s user experience.
Microsoft has stated that Windows Phone 8 has full internal storage encryption, and that although removable
media such as SD cards are not encrypted, they are only able to store music, videos, photos and e‐books 56 .
Apple’s iPad, iPhone 3GS and later models use hardware‐based cryptographic acceleration for protecting data.
BlackBerry devices support native encryption of internal storage 57 and removable media 58 .
Android version 3 Honeycomb introduced full device encryption 59 , though depending on a device’s
manufacturer, third party software might be required to encrypt removable media 60 .
Cryptographic implementations that have not been evaluated by ASD are unsuitable for protecting classified
Australian government data.
Avoid Printing via Untrusted Systems
Obtain written employee agreement to avoid printing sensitive data via untrusted printers outside of the office
such as from home, an airline lounge, a hotel or an Internet café. Otherwise, sensitive data might be exposed to
third parties due to printers or print servers storing a cached copy of printouts, or printouts being accidentally
left on the printer.
Personal Firewall
Obtain written employee agreement to use a personal firewall to help mitigate devices becoming compromised,
by limiting the exposure of network accessible services and controlling which applications can access the
network.
Additional Information
This risk management control is not applicable to some devices, such as those running iOS, that don’t expose
personal firewall functionality and avoid using network accessible services. Some devices, such as those running
Android, use an inbuilt application permission mechanism to control which applications are able to access the
network.
56
http://www.zdnet.com/windows‐phone‐8‐a‐tour‐of‐the‐business‐features‐7000006600/
57
http://www.dsd.gov.au/infosec/epl/view_document.php?document_id=OTA4IyMjMjAzLjYuNjkuMg==
58
http://docs.blackberry.com/en/smartphone_users/deliverables/39933/1812724.jsp
59
http://source.android.com/tech/encryption/android_crypto_implementation.html
60
http://code.google.com/p/android/issues/detail?id=11211
36
APPENDIX D: CORPORATELY APPROVED AND MANAGED DEVICES
FOR HIGHLY SENSITIVE DATA
This appendix provides guidance to manage risks associated with Scenario D. This scenario involves devices with
a hardware model and operating system version that:
is chosen by the employee from a corporately approved shortlist
has comprehensive risk management controls applied
is completely corporately managed, for example using ASD evaluated BlackBerry Enterprise Server or
Apple Configuration Profiles combined with Supervised Mode
potentially includes corporately managed separation of organisational data and personal data, for
example using remote virtual desktop software, a managed container or partitioning functionality built
into the operating system
uses a corporately managed mechanism to access and potentially store highly sensitive data, for
example using remote virtual desktop software or corporately approved native applications combined
with a Virtual Private Network.
For Australian government agencies, highly sensitive data is defined for the purpose of this document as data up
to PROTECTED.
The comprehensive risk management controls might restrict the device’s functionality to an extent that would
overly frustrate an employee using a personally owned device. Therefore, devices in this scenario might be
provided to employees by the organisation, with a reasonable degree of personal use permitted. Devices on the
shortlist might be limited to smartphones and tablets that are part of a single vendor’s ecosystem due to the
required compatibility with risk management controls. Organisations might retain ownership of devices for legal
reasons that facilitate the organisation monitoring devices, remotely wiping sensitive data, performing security
and legal investigations, and retaining ownership of intellectual property. Enabling employees to choose a
device from a corporately approved shortlist is referred to by some vendors as Choose Your Own Device,
especially if the device is purchased, owned and managed by the organisation.
This appendix builds upon and incorporates the high level objectives and risk management controls discussed in
Appendix C which covers devices from a corporately approved shortlist using a corporately managed mechanism
to access and potentially store sensitive data. Risk management controls in Appendix C that an organisation
considers unnecessary to protect sensitive data are likely to be necessary to protect highly sensitive data. High
level objectives associated with the example scenario in Appendix D also include maintaining the confidentiality
of highly sensitive data.
Corporately Enforced Risk Management Controls
The organisation is able to manage risk by enforcing the following technical controls.
37
Device Selection
Limit devices on the corporately approved shortlist to those devices that are evaluated by ASD and are
configured as per ASD’s consumer guides and device hardening guides. Prefer devices that have an application
marketplace with a good history of curation to exclude malware, for example by analysing applications for
suspicious behaviour, requiring applications to be cryptographically signed by a trusted authority instead of a
self‐signed certificate, and performing adequate verification of the identity of application developers.
Mobile Application Management and Enterprise Application Stores
Mobile Application Management enables the organisation to inventory, install, update and remove applications
and associated data on devices.
Using an enterprise application store enables the organisation to distribute and manage applications developed
by the organisation, and vet third party applications to determine their potential to expose highly sensitive data.
Additional Information
ASD’s ISM advises that employees should be prevented from installing unapproved applications that can access
unclassified FOUO/Sensitive data or classified data.
The use of Mobile Application Management and enterprise application stores is a more reliable approach to
avoiding the use of applications that might expose highly sensitive data, than simply relying on anti‐malware
software and employees to read user reviews and ratings before installing or updating applications. Whitelisting
permitted applications and updated versions of these applications, or less preferably attempting to identify and
blacklist every malicious or undesirable application, helps mitigate devices running applications that either:
are potentially malicious, undesirable, or not approved by the organisation
have the potential to expose highly sensitive data – this includes adware and potentially unwanted
applications that collect data from devices as part of the application’s revenue model
have undesirable interactions with other applications, for example using the “Open In...” feature to
open a highly sensitive email attachment in a consumer grade cloud storage application.
Some vendor implementations of Mobile Application Management also include functionality to effectively place
an application into its own managed container by wrapping it with security policy. Such security policies include:
requiring a passphrase to be entered before an application will run
enforcing encryption of an application’s stored data
requiring a Virtual Private Network connection to encrypt an application’s data in transit
limiting an application’s ability to copy and paste data.
Mobile Application Management might not be able to block powerful web applications that are written in
HTML5 and run within the web browser.
38Risk Management of
Enterprise Mobility
Including Bring Your Own Device
Table of Contents
Executive summary
4
Risk management of enterprise mobility
5
Potential benefits of enterprise mobility
5
Potential benefits of using personally owned devices
5
Develop an enterprise mobility strategy
5
Determine the extent of existing enterprise mobility
6
Develop business cases with suitable mobility approaches
6
Identify regulatory obligations and legislation
9
Allocate budget and personnel resources
10
Develop and communicate enterprise mobility policy
11
Monitor the implementation and report to management
13
Facilitate organisational transformation
13
Further information
14
Contact details
14
Appendix A: Arbitrary unmanaged devices for internet access
15
Corporately enforced risk management controls
15
User-reliant risk management controls
16
Appendix B: Arbitrary unmanaged devices for non-sensitive data
18
Corporately enforced risk management controls
18
Appendix C: Corporately approved and partially-managed devices for
sensitive data
19
Corporately enforced risk management controls
20
User-reliant risk management controls
28
2
Appendix D: Corporately approved and managed devices for highly sensitive
data
35
Corporately enforced risk management controls
35
3
Executive summary
Enterprise mobility enables employees to perform work in specified business‐case scenarios using devices such as
smartphones, tablets and laptops, while leveraging technologies that facilitate remote access to data. A well designed
enterprise mobility strategy can create opportunities for organisations to securely improve customer service delivery,
business efficiency and productivity. In addition, employees obtain increased flexibility to perform work regardless of
their physical location.
This document is developed by the Australian Signals Directorate (ASD), also known as the Defence Signals Directorate
(DSD), to provide senior business representatives with a list of enterprise mobility considerations. These include
business cases, regulatory obligations and legislation, available budget and personnel resources, and risk tolerance.
Additionally, risk management controls are provided for cyber security practitioners.
This document aims to assist readers to understand and help mitigate the significant risks associated with using devices
for work‐related purposes that have the potential to expose sensitive data. Risks are primarily due to the likelihood of
devices storing unprotected sensitive data being lost or stolen 1, use of corporately unapproved applications and cloud
services to handle sensitive data, inadequate separation between work‐related use and personal use of a device, and
the organisation having reduced assurance in the integrity and security posture of devices that are not corporately
managed. Additional risks arise due to legal liability, regulatory obligations and legislation requiring compliance, and the
implications for the organisation’s budget and personnel resources.
Risks can be partially mitigated through a policy outlining the permitted use of devices, including the required
behaviour expected from employees, which is complemented by technical risk management controls to enforce the
policy and detect violations.
Business cases for enterprise mobility that involve accessing non‐sensitive data might permit employees to use their
personally owned devices, referred to as Bring Your Own Device (BYOD).
Business cases for enterprise mobility that involve accessing and potentially storing sensitive data might permit
employees to use devices that are listed on a corporately approved shortlist of devices. Such devices are partially or
completely corporately managed to enforce policy and technical risk management controls. These controls can include
preventing unapproved applications from running and accessing sensitive data, applying patches to applications and
operating systems in a timely manner, and limiting the ability of employees to use devices that are ‘jailbroken’, ‘rooted’
or otherwise run with administrative privileges2. Optionally, some organisations might provide devices to employees,
permit a reasonable degree of personal use, and retain ownership of the devices for legal reasons that facilitate the
organisation monitoring devices, remotely wiping sensitive data, performing security and legal investigations, and
retaining ownership of intellectual property.
Before implementing enterprise mobility for a specific business case, organisations must decide whether applying the
chosen risk management controls would result in an acceptable level of residual risk.
1
2
http://www.amta.org.au/pages/amta/The.Mobile.Phone.Industry.Statement
http://www.dsd.gov.au/infosec/top35mitigationstrategies.htm
4
Risk management of enterprise mobility
Potential benefits of enterprise mobility
Potential benefits of enterprise mobility include:
improved customer service delivery, business efficiency and productivity, especially for employees who work out
of the office, are field agents, or who travel frequently
improved productivity that is independent of an employee’s physical location, and provides employees with the
opportunity to be productive when otherwise idle such as when travelling on public transport
enabling the recruitment of talented people from anywhere in the world who don’t want to relocate to the city of
the organisation’s office
flexible working hours enabling employees to blend personal time and professional time to achieve an integrated
work‐life balance
opportunities to transition employees on extended leave back into the workplace sooner by working part‐time
from home
reduced costs of real estate, building operations and building maintenance if employees hot‐desk and are
encouraged to work out of the office
business continuity if employees are unable to work in the office, for example due to an air conditioning failure,
power outage, public transport strike, flood, fire or other event
environmental benefits such as reduced commuting to the office and reduced use of printed paper.
Potential benefits of using personally owned devices
Potential benefits of using personally owned devices for enterprise mobility include:
reduced hardware costs for the organisation if employees pay for their device – an increasing number of
employees already own powerful devices and employees might take better care of a device if they contribute
their own money towards it
freedom for employees to use devices that they prefer, are familiar with and have tailored to their usage
preferences to increase their productivity
negating the need for employees to carry a device for work use and another device for personal use
improved employee job satisfaction, staff retention and recruitment of staff who desire the ability to use their
own device
leveraging modern technologies that empower employees to innovate faster and develop more efficient ways to
do their job, by taking advantage of employees who refresh their software and hardware more regularly than
organisations that provide outdated IT capability that is refreshed every 3‐5 years.
Develop an enterprise mobility strategy
Developing an enterprise mobility strategy is fundamentally important to an organisation successfully implementing
enterprise mobility to achieve business outcomes with an acceptable level of risk. In the absence of a strategy, the
organisation’s mobility might be driven by employees, without clear measures of success and without adequate
consideration of risks.
5
An enterprise mobility strategy might involve starting with a pilot trial consisting of a small number of users and a
business case that is low risk, high value and has clear measures of success. Subsequently reviewing the success of the
trial, including the costs and the impact to the organisation’s security posture, enables the organisation to make an
informed decision as to whether to increase their use of enterprise mobility.
The following sections in this document provide guidance for the steps associated with implementing the enterprise
mobility strategy that the organisation has developed.
Determine the extent of existing enterprise mobility
The extent of existing authorised and unauthorised enterprise mobility can be informed by talking to business
representatives and employees, reviewing the organisation’s asset inventory of assigned devices, and using security
controls to detect:
rogue Wi‐Fi access points located on the organisation’s premises
unauthorised devices accessing the corporate network or accessing the Internet via the organisation’s network
infrastructure
employees obtaining a copy of organisational data via removable storage media, email or cloud services.
Develop business cases with suitable mobility approaches
Justified business cases for enterprise mobility have tangible and measured benefits to the organisation, its employees
and customers. These benefits outweigh the risks and costs to the organisation. Clearly defining each business case,
including specifying what organisational data needs to be accessed, provides a better understanding of the
opportunities and benefits versus the risks and costs to the organisation.
Example business cases
Organisations developing enterprise mobility business cases might decide to permit employees to:
collaborate with other employees via instant messaging or video conferencing
use work‐related software including applications developed by the organisation
send, receive and print work‐related emails with file attachments
access, develop, print, store and share work‐related files that reside in data repositories such as SharePoint,
network shares or enterprise grade cloud storage
access calendars, contacts, intranet websites and intranet web applications
access the Internet using the organisation’s network infrastructure.
Example enterprise mobility approaches and scenarios
An example enterprise mobility implementation might involve a combination of the following approaches.
Scenario A
This scenario involves using devices with a hardware model and operating system version that:
is arbitrarily chosen by the employee
has minimal risk management controls applied – further details are provided in Appendix A
is corporately unmanaged
6
is used to access the Internet via the organisation’s network infrastructure.
Scenario B
This scenario involves using devices with a hardware model and operating system version that:
is arbitrarily chosen by the employee
has minimal risk management controls applied – further details are provided in Appendix B
is corporately unmanaged
is used to access non‐sensitive data.
For Australian government agencies, non‐sensitive data is defined for the purpose of this document as data that is
unclassified. Examples of non‐sensitive data are unclassified computer based training courses and unclassified intranet
web applications.
Scenario C
This scenario involves using devices with a hardware model and operating system version that:
is chosen by the employee from a corporately approved shortlist
has moderate risk management controls applied – further details are provided in Appendix C
uses corporately managed separation of organisational data and personal data, for example using remote virtual
desktop software, a managed container or partitioning functionality built into the operating system
uses a corporately managed mechanism to access and potentially store sensitive data, for example using remote
virtual desktop software or corporately approved native applications combined with a Virtual Private Network.
For Australian government agencies, sensitive data is defined for the purpose of this document as data that is
unclassified with dissemination limiting markers such as For Official Use Only (FOUO), Sensitive, Sensitive:Legal or
Sensitive:Personal. Examples of sensitive data are corporate emails, calendars and contacts, as well as files residing in
SharePoint, network shares or enterprise grade cloud storage.
Devices in this scenario might be provided to employees by the organisation, with a reasonable degree of personal use
permitted. Organisations might retain ownership of devices for legal reasons that facilitate the organisation monitoring
devices, remotely wiping sensitive data, performing security and legal investigations, and retaining ownership of
intellectual property. Enabling employees to choose a device from a corporately approved shortlist is referred to by
some vendors as Choose Your Own Device, especially if the device is purchased, owned and managed by the
organisation.
Scenario D
This scenario involves using devices with a hardware model and operating system version that:
3
4
is chosen by the employee from a corporately approved shortlist
has comprehensive risk management controls applied – further details are provided in Appendix D
is completely corporately managed, for example using ASD evaluated BlackBerry Enterprise Server3 or Apple
Configuration Profiles combined with Supervised Mode 4
http://www.dsd.gov.au/infosec/epl/index_details.php?product_id=MTE2IyMjMjAzLjYuNjkuMg==
http://www.dsd.gov.au/publications/iOS5_Hardening_Guide.pdf
7
potentially includes corporately managed separation of organisational data and personal data, for example using
remote virtual desktop software, a managed container or partitioning functionality built into the operating system
uses a corporately managed mechanism to access and potentially store highly sensitive data, for example using
remote virtual desktop software or corporately approved native applications combined with a Virtual Private
Network.
For Australian government agencies, highly sensitive data is defined for the purpose of this document as data up to
PROTECTED.
The comprehensive risk management controls might restrict the device’s functionality to an extent that would overly
frustrate an employee using a personally owned device. Therefore, devices in this scenario might be provided to
employees by the organisation, with a reasonable degree of personal use permitted. Devices on the shortlist might be
limited to smartphones and tablets that are part of a single vendor’s ecosystem due to the required compatibility with
risk management controls. Organisations might retain ownership of devices for legal reasons that facilitate the
organisation monitoring devices, remotely wiping sensitive data, performing security and legal investigations, and
retaining ownership of intellectual property. Enabling employees to choose a device from a corporately approved
shortlist is referred to by some vendors as Choose Your Own Device, especially if the device is purchased, owned and
managed by the organisation.
Considerations for choosing enterprise mobility approaches
When selecting an enterprise mobility approach for a particular business case, consider the employee’s job role, the
sensitivity of the data to be accessed, risk management controls and their impact to employee privacy and user
experience. Also consider whether the level of residual risk is acceptable to the organisation, and costs to the
organisation such as the level of technical support and financial support provided to employees.
These considerations are represented in Figure 1 which reflects the example enterprise mobility scenarios mentioned
previously. Detailed risk management controls for each enterprise mobility scenario are provided in the appendices of
this document.
8
Figure 1. Example enterprise mobility scenarios vary in their suitability to handle sensitive data, their cost and their impact to the
employee’s user experience.
Identify regulatory obligations and legislation
ASD develops and publishes the Australian Government Information Security Manual (ISM)5. The ISM advises that
legal advice must be obtained before allowing personally owned devices to connect to organisational systems.
Neither the ISM nor this document are to be considered as legal advice. An organisation’s legal representatives must
determine to what extent enterprise mobility can be used based on regulatory obligations and legislation affecting their
organisation. Relevant legislation includes the Privacy Act 1988, the Privacy Amendment (Enhancing Privacy
Protection) Act 2012 6, state and territory privacy laws including Acts covering surveillance of employees 7, the
Archives Act 1983 and the Freedom of Information Act 1982. Organisations need to maintain an awareness of
relevant legislation and address any associated impacts to their organisation.
5
http://www.dsd.gov.au/infosec/ism/index.htm
http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy‐portal/resources_privacy/Privacy_law_reform.html
7
http://www.privacy.gov.au/law/states
6
9
Aspects of enterprise mobility requiring legal advice might include:
whether the organisation is permitted to monitor devices and network traffic to identify policy violations and
other security incidents
whether the organisation is permitted to monitor the use of personally owned devices outside of the
organisation’s premises, including remotely locating and tracking a device’s location based on the device’s GPS
coordinates, nearby mobile cell towers or the location of nearby known Wi‐Fi networks
whether the organisation is permitted to access personal data stored on a device when performing a security or
legal investigation – personal data includes emails, history of websites accessed, calendar, contacts and photos, as
well as personal data stored in the employee’s personal consumer grade webmail or cloud storage account
what action an organisation should take if violations of civil law or criminal law are accidentally discovered while
analysing an employee’s device or network traffic
insurance and liability for compensation, repair or replacement of an employee’s device that is lost, stolen,
compromised with malware or is otherwise damaged and potentially causes injury – such damage might occur
through no fault of the employee’s including while using the device in the office for work‐related purposes
legal liability resulting from an organisation remotely wiping personal data 8, especially if the device is owned by
someone who has not provided written consent, such as the estate of a deceased employee
legal liability resulting from devices spreading malware or otherwise harming other computers
legal liability to the organisation resulting from employees having or transferring to organisational systems any
software or data that is pirated, infringing copyright or is inappropriately licenced 9
whether the organisation or the employee owns the intellectual property and copyright of work that is performed
on an employee’s device, especially if performed outside of traditional business hours.
Allocate budget and personnel resources
Organisations implementing enterprise mobility might encounter a variety of costs such as:
subsidising or completely paying for the cost of devices and associated work‐related expenses
responding to security breaches, policy violations and regulatory compliance violations
personnel resources needed from a variety of sections across the organisation to collaboratively develop the
enterprise mobility strategy and associated policies
implementing risk management controls such as licencing security software and user education
upgrading the organisation’s IT infrastructure including the Wi‐Fi network 10, Internet bandwidth, as well as the
data centre’s network, storage and server processing capacity
cyber security personnel to architect the IT infrastructure and perform ongoing device management, monitoring
and reporting
additional software Client Access Licences for Microsoft Windows server and client operating systems as well as
for Microsoft Office, especially if the organisation pays for software licences per device instead of per user
training IT help desk staff to support a variety of devices – at a minimum providing employees with configuration
settings and basic training to connect to permitted organisational networks and systems
8
http://www.npr.org/2010/11/22/131511381/wipeout‐when‐your‐company‐kills‐your‐iphone
http://www.zdnet.com/au/byod‐could‐open‐businesses‐to‐copyright‐litigation‐bsa‐7000010533/
10
http://www.dsd.gov.au/publications/csocprotect/wireless_network_security_tech_advice.htm
9
10
modifying intranet websites and web applications to support a variety of web browsers
enhancing identity and access management infrastructure to perform authentication and authorisation of
employees and devices
developing mobile web applications or native software applications to interact with organisational data,
potentially requiring the use of middleware solutions enabling access to data storage repositories.
Develop and communicate enterprise mobility policy
ASD’s ISM advises that enterprise mobility policy must be developed to govern the use of devices accessing
organisational data.
Policy relies on user adherence and is likely to be more effective if it exhibits the following characteristics:
offers enterprise mobility as opt‐in instead of mandatory, unless the organisation is willing to completely pay for
the cost of devices and associated work‐related costs
is jointly developed by an advisory board consisting of stakeholders including the cyber security team, system and
network administrators, human resources, finance, legal, senior management and employees – this consultative
process helps to ensure that stakeholders have had input, are willing to adhere to the policy and accept any
additional responsibilities to protect organisational data
clearly states what types of organisational data are permitted to be accessed from which devices and which
applications – the absence of an application strategy might result in employees using applications that haven’t
been vetted by the organisation to determine their potential to expose sensitive data
clearly states how organisational data is permitted to be stored and distributed, for example using corporately
managed data repositories such as SharePoint, network shares or enterprise grade cloud storage, while avoiding
the use of consumer grade cloud storage and personal consumer grade webmail
clearly states which risk management controls apply and deters employees from circumventing these controls by
helping employees to understand why policy rules exist
requires employees to sign an Acceptable Use Policy that clearly states the required behaviour expected from
employees and the consequences of violations
is communicated throughout the organisation to enable employees to understand their obligations and the policy,
to ensure full awareness of the existence of the policy and ramifications of non‐compliance –the organisation
needs to determine which business representatives are responsible for remediating non‐compliance, which is
complemented by a documented dispute escalation and resolution process
is complemented by technical risk management controls to enforce the policy and detect violations, especially in
cases where an employee dishonours their written agreement to adhere to the policy
minimises negative impacts to the employee’s user experience – negative impacts include requiring a very
complex unlock passphrase, automatically locking a device’s screen after a very short idle timeout period,
excessively limiting a device’s functionality, and deleting personal data when wiping an entire device remotely or
after a very small number of consecutive incorrect unlock passphrase attempts
states the technical support and financial support that employees can obtain
documents the on‐boarding process for employees to obtain signed approval from their manager, register their
device, have the organisational policy applied, and potentially have software installed on their device to assist the
organisation to configure and manage the device
documents the off‐boarding process to remove organisational software and data from devices that are lost, stolen
or de‐provisioned including when employees cease employment
11
provides a business representative point of contact in case employees have feedback about the policy
is reviewed and refined if necessary, initially on a quarterly basis while enterprise mobility is still new to the
organisation, and then on an annual basis.
Surveying employees can help reveal whether they would be willing to accept the policy and participate in enterprise
mobility business cases, noting that some employees might perceive that:
costs will be shifted from the organisation to them
their privacy will be invaded
the functionality of their device will be excessively limited
personal data stored on their device will be deleted or exposed
they will be expected to be on call to answer emails and phone calls at all times outside of traditional business
hours.
Technical support
It is impractical for an organisation’s IT help desk to support devices from a large variety of manufacturers running a
large variety of operating systems with a large variety of configuration settings. Therefore, the amount of technical
support provided to employees depends on the organisation’s personnel resources, whether devices are listed on a
corporately approved shortlist of devices, and the degree to which devices are necessary for employees to perform
their job. Technical support might include:
providing guests, contractors and other employees with details of how to connect to the organisation’s guest Wi‐
Fi network to access the Internet
providing employees with details of how to connect to permitted organisational networks and systems, and the
organisation obtaining visibility of security incidents that place the organisation’s data at risk
providing an internal self‐service community support web forum enabling employees to assist each other, with
the IT help desk advertising the existence of the internal web forum and occasionally contributing to web forum
discussions to answer frequently asked questions – an internal web forum helps to mitigate the risk of employees
disclosing details about the organisation’s network infrastructure configuration when seeking assistance on
publicly visible Internet forums
providing employees with as much technical support as the IT help desk is capable of, including a short term loan
of a device to keep an employee productive while they get their damaged device repaired
providing employees with full technical support, including replacing damaged or broken devices.
Financial support
Financial support might have Fringe Benefit Tax implications due to the organisation paying for a device or Internet and
telecommunications connectivity that is used for personal use, especially outside of business hours 11. The amount of
financial support provided to employees depends on the organisation’s financial resources and the degree to which
devices are necessary for employees to perform their job. Financial support might include:
acknowledging work‐related costs incurred in support of employees making tax deductible claims
providing employees with a taxable allowance or stipend, or otherwise subsidising or reimbursing the cost of a
device, contractually obligating employees to repay a pro‐rata portion if they cease employment within a set time
period
11
http://www.ato.gov.au/businesses/content.aspx?doc=/content/00167381.htm
12
providing employees with a device that is completely paid for by the organisation, contractually obligating
employees to return the device if they cease employment within a set time period or if the organisation retains
ownership of the device
providing employees with reimbursement for the work‐related portion of the monthly bill from the employee’s
telecommunications carrier and Internet Service Provider, noting that rates associated with a consumer plan
might be higher than rates associated with a corporate plan
providing employees with a corporate SIM card or otherwise arranging Internet and telecommunications
connectivity via a corporate plan, using an automated process to recover the employee’s portion of the monthly
bill via payroll based on criteria that indicate personal use –expensive data roaming charges for employees
travelling overseas can be mitigated by providing employees with a prepaid SIM card associated with a
telecommunications carrier in the foreign country, or by disabling data roaming via Mobile Device Management
to only allow Wi‐Fi data connectivity12
providing employees with reimbursement for the cost of essential work‐related software, noting that software
licenced to an employee via a consumer licence instead of an enterprise licence is unlikely to be transferable to a
different employee
providing employees with reimbursement for the cost of essential peripherals and accessories.
Monitor the implementation and report to management
Ongoing monitoring of the enterprise mobility implementation includes reviewing logs from Mobile Device
Management and other log sources such as network logs, user authentication logs and security software.
Regular reporting to management helps them to understand and address unacceptable risks, and assess whether the
benefits of enterprise mobility to the organisation justify the risks and costs to the organisation. Information to report
to management includes:
the degree of compliance with regulatory obligations, legislation and organisational policies
the severity and number of policy violations and other security incidents
the names of employees who are regularly involved in policy violations and other security incidents
costs of IT infrastructure including network upgrades, Internet bandwidth, data storage and server processing
capacity
costs of risk management controls
costs of providing employees with technical support and financial support
the names of employees causing an excessive cost burden due to their use of Internet bandwidth, data storage,
technical support or financial support.
Facilitate organisational transformation
Organisations might update their business processes to leverage enterprise mobility, potentially even transforming the
organisation to embrace opportunities such as activity‐based working 13 by:
reviewing the success of enterprise mobility pilot trials, including the costs and the impact to the organisation’s
security posture
reviewing and updating the organisation’s enterprise mobility strategy
12
13
http://www.zdnet.com/au/telstra‐phone‐theft‐bill‐shock‐shows‐roaming‐still‐broken‐7000008331/
http://www.smh.com.au/it‐pro/business‐it/kpmg‐testruns‐future‐workplace‐20121119‐29m1j.html
13
making an informed decision whether to increase the scope of enterprise mobility to identify and pursue
additional innovative cost‐effective opportunities to improve customer service delivery, efficiency and
productivity with a level of risk that is acceptable to the organisation.
Further information
The Australian Government Information Security Manual (ISM) assists in the protection of information that is
processed, stored or communicated by organisations’ systems. This publication can be found at
https://www.acsc.gov.au/infosec/ism/.
The Strategies to Mitigate Cyber Security Incidents complements the advice in the ISM. The complete list of
mitigation strategies and supporting publications can be found at
https://www.acsc.gov.au/infosec/mitigationstrategies.htm.
Contact details
Organisations or individuals with questions regarding this advice can contact the ACSC by emailing
asd.assist@defence.gov.au or calling 1300 CYBER1 (1300 292 371).
14
Appendix A: Arbitrary unmanaged devices for
internet access
This appendix provides guidance to manage risks associated with Scenario A. This scenario involves devices with a
hardware model and operating system version that:
is arbitrarily chosen by the employee
has minimal risk management controls applied
is corporately unmanaged
is used to access the Internet via the organisation’s network infrastructure.
This implementation can enable organisations to apply more stringent web content filtering controls on the corporate
network to reduce the risk of corporate workstations becoming compromised.
High level objectives associated with this example scenario include:
avoid unauthorised access to the organisation’s corporate network to help prevent employees introducing
malware onto organisational systems or exposing sensitive data
mitigate the threat of sensitive work‐related discussions being recorded by Internet telephony, voice recognition
or other voice recording applications
maintain the availability of organisational Internet connectivity at an acceptable cost
reduce the risk of legal liability to the organisation resulting from:
compromised devices spreading malware or harming other computers on the Internet
employees downloading copyright infringing movies, music or software from the Internet
software or data that is pirated, infringing copyright, or used for work‐related purposes even though it is only
licenced for home use, non‐commercial use or educational use
employees accessing pornography or other offensive material while in the office, during working hours, from
devices subsidised by the organisation or via the organisation’s network infrastructure.
Corporately enforced risk management controls
The organisation is able to manage risk by enforcing the following technical controls.
Filtering and monitoring network traffic
Implement:
basic Internet web content filtering to block access to known piracy, pornographic and offensive websites
bandwidth throttling and Quality of Service to prioritise work‐related network traffic
bandwidth quotas per user and per device to prevent employees from using excessive bandwidth
network traffic logging, archiving and monitoring to help identify policy violations and security incidents.
15
Separation between the organisation’s corporate network and the guest Wi‐Fi network
Separate the organisation’s internal corporate network from the guest Wi‐Fi network that enables corporately
unmanaged and untrustworthy devices to access the Internet.
Corporate workstations configured to block access to unauthorised devices
Configure corporate workstations to block access to unauthorised devices, for example USB devices 14 15, Bluetooth
devices, Wi‐Fi access points, mobile hotspots and other devices with 3G/4G connectivity. This helps mitigate the risk of
corporate workstations either exchanging data with unauthorised devices, or tethering to devices and accessing the
Internet via an unmonitored and unfiltered Internet gateway.
User-reliant risk management controls
The following technical controls and policy controls to manage risk rely on employees complying with policy.
Anti-malware software
Obtain written employee agreement to use anti‐malware software which helps mitigate devices being compromised.
This control is less applicable to devices that use a strong sandbox design, and limit the execution of applications to only
those that are cryptographically signed by a trusted authority and originate from an application marketplace with a
good history of curation to exclude malware16.
Additional information
The organisation might offer anti‐malware software free of charge when employees access the Internet via a captive
portal and agree to the policy.
Signature‐based antivirus software is a reactive approach that is unlikely to protect against targeted malware that the
antivirus vendor doesn’t have visibility of. Anti‐malware software extends signature‐based antivirus software to
typically include heuristic detection, identification of applications behaving suspiciously, as well as reputation checking
of applications and websites accessed.
Avoid behaviour that is unauthorised, excessive, offensive or unlawful
Obtain written employee agreement to:
only access organisational systems or data that they are explicitly permitted to access
avoid sensitive work‐related discussions being recorded by Internet telephony, voice recognition 17 or other voice
recording applications
use organisational Internet connectivity as per existing policy, which might disallow accessing offensive and
copyright infringing content, disallow excessive use of Internet bandwidth for example via personal use of
YouTube, and require employees to accept the risk of their device being compromised
ensure that their device doesn’t contain or transfer to organisational systems any software or data that is pirated,
infringing copyright, or used for work‐related purposes even though it is only licenced for home use, non‐
commercial use or educational use
14
http://www.securelist.com/en/blog/805/Mobile_attacks
http://www.dsd.gov.au/videos/cybersense1.htm
16
http://www.apple.com/ipad/business/it‐center/security.html
17
http://www.zdnet.com/apple‐stores‐your‐voice‐data‐for‐two‐years‐7000014216/
15
16
not deliberately access pornography or other offensive material while in the office, during working hours, from
devices subsidised by the organisation, or via the organisation’s network infrastructure – Australian Public Service
employees are bound by the Australian Public Service Code of Conduct and Values even when working out of the
office using their own device.
17
Appendix B: Arbitrary unmanaged devices for nonsensitive data
This appendix provides guidance to manage risks associated with Scenario B. This scenario involves devices with a
hardware model and operating system version that:
is arbitrarily chosen by the employee
has minimal risk management controls applied
is corporately unmanaged
is used to access non‐sensitive data.
For Australian government agencies, non‐sensitive data is defined for the purpose of this document as data that is
unclassified. Examples of non‐sensitive data are unclassified computer based training courses and unclassified intranet
web applications.
This appendix builds upon and incorporates the high level objectives and risk management controls discussed in
Appendix A which covers arbitrary corporately unmanaged devices used to access the Internet via the organisation’s
network infrastructure. High level objectives associated with the example scenario in Appendix B also include:
avoid unauthorised access to organisational systems and data
avoid untrustworthy devices compromising organisational systems that are permitted to be accessed.
Corporately enforced risk management controls
The organisation is able to manage risk by enforcing the following technical controls.
Segmentation and segregation between devices and organisational systems
Appropriately architect and segment the organisation’s corporate network using a combination of security enforcing
mechanisms such as firewalls, reverse proxies, Virtual Local Area Networks and Virtual Private Networks. This helps
mitigate devices accessing unauthorised organisational systems and data.
Web application and operating system vulnerability assessment and security hardening
Perform vulnerability assessments and security hardening of web applications and operating systems running on
organisational systems that are permitted to be accessed. This helps mitigate devices compromising organisational
systems and their data.
18
Appendix C: Corporately approved and partiallymanaged devices for sensitive data
This appendix provides guidance to manage risks associated with Scenario C. This scenario involves devices with a
hardware model and operating system version that:
is chosen by the employee from a corporately approved shortlist
has moderate risk management controls applied
uses corporately managed separation of organisational data and personal data, for example using remote virtual
desktop software, a managed container or partitioning functionality built into the operating system
uses a corporately managed mechanism to access and potentially store sensitive data, for example using remote
virtual desktop software or corporately approved native applications combined with a Virtual Private Network.
For Australian government agencies, sensitive data is defined for the purpose of this document as data that is
unclassified with dissemination limiting markers such as For Official Use Only (FOUO), Sensitive, Sensitive:Legal or
Sensitive:Personal. Examples of sensitive data are corporate emails, calendars and contacts, as well as files residing in
SharePoint, network shares or enterprise grade cloud storage.
Devices in this scenario might be provided to employees by the organisation, with a reasonable degree of personal use
permitted. Organisations might retain ownership of devices for legal reasons that facilitate the organisation monitoring
devices, remotely wiping sensitive data, performing security and legal investigations, and retaining ownership of
intellectual property. Enabling employees to choose a device from a corporately approved shortlist is referred to by
some vendors as Choose Your Own Device, especially if the device is purchased, owned and managed by the
organisation.
This appendix builds upon and incorporates the high level objectives and risk management controls discussed in
Appendix B which covers arbitrary corporately unmanaged devices used to access non‐sensitive data. High level
objectives associated with the example scenario in Appendix C also include:
protect the organisation’s financial investment in the cost of devices
maintain the availability and integrity of organisational data for business continuity
maintain the confidentiality of sensitive data
maintain corporate ownership of organisational data created by employees using their device
rapidly respond to policy violations, data spills and other security incidents
be able to perform electronic discovery for litigation cases and freedom of information requests.
Some of the risk management controls described in this appendix might be unnecessary or impractical depending on
the organisation’s business case, the sensitivity of data accessed by devices, the use of other risk management controls,
and the type of device noting that some controls focus primarily on smartphones and tablets rather than laptops.
An example shortlist of devices from which employees can choose is a smartphone or tablet device running:
iOS version 5.1 or later18
BlackBerry version 5 or later
18
Mention of any vendor product is for illustrative purposes only and does not imply ASD’s endorsement of the
product. All trademarks are the property of their respective owners.
19
Windows version 8 or later
Android version 4 or later running on devices from specifically named hardware manufacturers with a history of
distributing security updates in a timely manner.
The shortlist of devices is regularly updated to reflect newly available devices on the market and is limited to only
devices that:
are compatible with required business applications developed by the organisation and by third parties
the organisation has the technical knowledge to support, resulting in more predictable support costs
meet minimum requirements specified by the organisation, including compatibility with the organisation’s chosen
risk management controls such as Mobile Device Management as well as managed separation mechanisms such
as managed containers
provide the organisation with adequate assurance of the device’s ability to appropriately protect sensitive data
comply with Australian legislation19 and are covered by Australian warranties.
Corporately enforced risk management controls
The organisation is able to manage risk by enforcing the following technical controls.
Overview of managed separation, remote virtual desktop and Mobile Device Management
ASD’s ISM advises that devices without ASD approved encryption should not store unclassified FOUO/Sensitive data
and must not store classified data. Additionally, ASD’s ISM advises that employees should be prevented from installing
unapproved applications that can access unclassified FOUO/Sensitive data or classified data.
Risk management controls used to follow this guidance include using managed separation such as an encrypted
managed container, preferably combined with Mobile Device Management to provide some basic assurance in the
device’s underlying operating system configuration, or using appropriately configured remote virtual desktop software.
Use of the phrase ‘remote virtual desktop software’ in this document incorporates virtualised applications and Virtual
Desktop Infrastructure (VDI).
Organisations might choose to use managed separation for some business cases such as an ASD evaluated encrypted
managed container20 on evaluated smartphones21 with small screens, and remote virtual desktop software for other
business cases such as unevaluated devices or devices with large screens.
Detailed information about managed separation, remote virtual desktop software and Mobile Device Management is
provided in the following pages of this appendix. Figure 2 shows the comparative ability of these risk management
controls to protect organisational data and their negative impact to the employee’s user experience. All of the
implementations shown include basic risk management controls such as applying vendor security patches in a timely
manner, using up‐to‐date anti‐malware software and performing backups of work data to backup servers specified by
the organisation. These risk management controls won’t prevent a malicious employee from copying organisational
data by taking a screenshot or photograph of their device’s screen.
19
http://www.acma.gov.au/webwr/_assets/main/lib310037/summary%20of%20labelling%20requirements%20‐
%20fs89.pdf
20
http://www.dsd.gov.au/infosec/epl/index_details.php?product_id=MzA5IyMjMjAzLjYuNjkuMg==
21
http://www.dsd.gov.au/infosec/epl/
20
Figure 2. Risk management controls vary in their ability to protect organisational data and their negative impact to the
employee’s user experience.
Managed separation
Managed separation helps protect and isolate organisational data stored on devices. Organisational data is logically
separated from the employee’s personal operating environment, limiting the ability of such data to spread, and
facilitating the remote wiping of only organisational data.
21
Additional information
There are several different types of separation mechanisms including partitioning functionality built into the operating
system as well as mechanisms bolted on top of the operating system such as managed containers 22 23. Emerging
technology includes type 1 hypervisors and type 2 hypervisors providing a locally virtualised operating system24. Some
separation mechanisms are designed to ensure that organisational data can only be accessed by applications that have
been vetted by the organisation.
Managed containers, type 2 hypervisors or other mechanisms bolted onto the operating system provide reduced
security if there is inadequate assurance in the integrity and security posture of the operating system.
Use of a managed container has the following corporate benefits with associated potential impacts to the employee’s
user experience:
requiring employees to enter an additional passphrase to access organisational data
data encryption that is independent of the encryption provided by a device’s operating system –software‐based
encryption might slow down the device due to cryptographic overhead
reducing the risk of data leakage by restricting employees to use only corporately approved applications to handle
organisational data, while limiting the ability of such applications to copy organisational data to corporately
unapproved cloud services or elsewhere beyond the managed container.
Organisations considering using a managed container need to determine whether the vendor has access to
organisational data or cryptographic keys used to decrypt organisational data.
Remote virtual desktop software
Appropriately configured remote virtual desktop software helps keep organisational data in the organisation’s data
centre and not stored on devices, while still enabling employees to access organisational data and applications.
Additional information
ASD’s ISM advises that unclassified FOUO/Sensitive data or classified data exchanged during the entire remote virtual
desktop session must be encrypted using ASD approved encryption.
ASD’s experience is that remote virtual desktop software does not necessarily keep organisational data in the data
centre or prevent such data being transferred to and from devices. Some remote virtual desktop software contains
functionality to deliberately enable organisational data to be copied to and from devices, including the ability for
malware on devices to be introduced into the remote virtual desktop as shown in Figure 3 below.
22
23
http://www.dsd.gov.au/infosec/epl/view_document.php?document_id=OTUxIyMjMjAzLjYuNjkuMg==
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2013/03/14/blackberry_secure/
24
http://computerworld.com/s/article/print/9233834/Dual_identity_smartphones_could_bridge_BYOD_private_corpora
te_divide
22
Figure 3. In this example, an employee is accessing their Android device’s file system and removable media from within the
remote virtual desktop running Microsoft Windows. The employee is able to copy organisational data to their device, and
introduce malware into the remote virtual desktop. This employee behaviour results in a less stringent audit trail than if email
was used to extract organisational data or to introduce malware.
There are a variety of ways in which organisational data might leak out of the remote virtual desktop and be stored
unprotected on devices. Risk management controls to help mitigate such data leakage include:
appropriately configuring remote virtual desktop software running on the server and on the device to help
mitigate the employee printing to local printers, printing to local files, accessing their device’s file system and
removable media from within the remote virtual desktop, and using the clipboard to copy and paste data in both
directions between the remote virtual desktop and the device
23
using full device encryption to help protect organisational data that might inadvertently be stored on the device,
especially if the device is a laptop due to the possibility of data in memory being written to disk as part of a
page/swap file or hibernation/sleep file
obtaining written agreement from employees to avoid deliberately copying organisational data to their device
and to avoid introducing potential malware from their device into the remote virtual desktop
partially mitigating keystroke logging software and malware that enables an adversary to take screenshots of the
remote virtual desktop by using up‐to‐date anti‐malware software on devices, ensuring that all vendor security
patches are applied to devices as soon as patches are available from the vendor, and educating employees to
avoid installing potentially malicious applications
configuring the remote virtual desktop to lock its screen after a short idle timeout period to help mitigate an
adversary using a compromised device to control the remote virtual desktop’s mouse and keyboard
disallowing the use of keyboard applications featuring a custom dictionary or predictive text which capture
sensitive words or word combinations typed into the remote virtual desktop and save such sensitive data on the
device’s local file system25.
The following impacts of remote virtual desktop software should be considered prior to implementation:
the requirement for employees to have reliable Internet connectivity
the impact on the employee’s user experience especially for devices with small screens such as smartphones – for
example, using remote virtual desktop software to turn a smartphone into a dumb terminal might frustrate
employees trying to send an email using Microsoft Outlook running on an older version of Microsoft Windows
that was not designed for a touch interface
the potential requirement for the organisation to upgrade their network and data centre’s storage and server
processing capacity
the potential requirement for the organisation to purchase additional Client Access Licences for Microsoft
Windows server and client operating systems as well as for Microsoft Office.
Mobile Device Management
Mobile Device Management configures and audits devices, including enforcing aspects of the policy such as:
the device enrolment process, which might involve installing software on the device to assist the organisation to
manage the device and a digital certificate to authenticate the device to the network
unlock passphrases having a specified minimum length and required complexity
the device idle timeout period until the device’s screen is automatically locked
the number of consecutive failed passphrase attempts until the device is automatically wiped
the capability to perform remote tracking, locking and wiping of devices
the ability of employees to print to non‐organisational printers
encryption of data at rest and in transit, including Virtual Private Network configuration settings
the ability for employees to use their device’s camera, microphone, Bluetooth, USB interface, removable media or
GPS, particularly while on organisational premises
25
http://support.swiftkey.net/knowledgebase/articles/9101‐swiftkey‐is‐predicting‐my‐password‐how‐do‐i‐stop
24
detecting, reporting and blocking devices that are jailbroken or rooted, noting that detection is not perfect and
relies on an untrusted device to tell the truth about its software 26
endpoint compliance checking including whether patches and anti‐malware software are up to date
disabling the backup of unprotected sensitive data to consumer grade cloud storage such as iCloud, while still
enabling an employee’s personal data to be backed up
configuring appropriate email and Wi‐Fi connectivity settings
disabling inbuilt voice recording applications that send captured voice over the Internet
ongoing device management, monitoring and asset tracking.
Additional information
ASD’s ISM advises that mobile devices accessing unclassified FOUO/Sensitive data or classified data:
should use Mobile Device Management to ensure that organisational policy is applied, enabling organisations to
centrally manage the configuration of devices and audit adherence to policy
must prevent employees from disabling security functions on a device once provisioned
should be regularly tested to ensure that devices are still secure, for example that their configuration aligns with
the organisation’s policy and that security updates have been applied on a regular basis.
Using Mobile Device Management to enforce an organisation’s unreasonably strict policy, especially when employee is
not using their device for work‐related purposes, might negatively affect the employee’s user experience.
Organisations considering using Mobile Device Management need to determine whether the vendor has access to
sensitive data such as a device’s unlock passphrase.
Multi-factor authentication
Multi‐factor authentication helps mitigate an adversary accessing organisational systems by using compromised
employee corporate account credentials27.
Additional information
ASD’s ISM advises that multi‐factor authentication must be used for remote access to government systems.
Employees should log off organisational systems when finished, so that multi‐factor authentication is required to regain
access. Organisational systems should be configured to log users off after an idle timeout period.
A physically separate hardware multi‐factor authentication token with a time‐based value, stored separately to the
employee’s device, can provide greater security than a soft token such as an SMS or software application that displays
an authentication token value on the employee’s device. If the device is compromised 28 29 or if its SIM card is reissued
to an adversary30, the employee’s soft token value can be accessed by the adversary, thereby defeating the multi‐factor
authentication mechanism.
Using multi‐factor authentication doesn’t completely mitigate the risk of typing a corporate passphrase into an
untrustworthy device. An adversary might obtain the employee’s corporate passphrase when the employee types it
into a compromised device. The adversary could then use this passphrase during a subsequent intrusion, for example
26
http://www.networkworld.com/news/2010/121010‐apple‐ios‐jailbreak.html
http://www.dsd.gov.au/publications/csocprotect/multi_factor_authentication.htm
28
http://www.securitybistro.com/blog/?p=4226
29
http://www.scmagazine.com/zeus‐for‐android‐steals‐one‐time‐banking‐passwords/article/207286/
30
http://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2013/01/20/indian‐two‐factor‐authentication‐fraudsters‐busted‐by‐delhi‐cops/
27
25
by gaining physical access to a corporate workstation and simply logging in as the employee. Alternatively, the
adversary could use a spear phishing email to compromise any employee’s workstation on the corporate network and
use the previously obtained passphrase to access sensitive data on network drives.
To help mitigate this risk, either require multi‐factor authentication for all employee logins including logins to corporate
workstations in the office, or require that corporate passphrases entered by employees into untrustworthy devices are
different to corporate passphrases entered into corporate workstations in the office.
Encryption of data in transit
Encrypting data in transit helps mitigate organisational data being accessed by an adversary who has access to device’s
network communications. Such access might result from the use of a Wi‐Fi access point that is unencrypted, or the use
of any networking infrastructure that is not controlled by the organisation and is therefore considered untrustworthy.
Additional information
ASD’s ISM advises that ASD approved encryption must be used to encrypt unclassified FOUO/Sensitive data or classified
data in transit over untrustworthy network infrastructure. For example, data sent over an untrusted network such as
the Internet could be protected by using ASD approved encryption implemented via a Virtual Private Network or
remote virtual desktop software. ASD approved Wi‐Fi Protected Access 2 (WPA2) could be used for protecting data that
only requires protection when exchanged between a device and an organisation’s Wi‐Fi access point.
ASD’s ISM advises that split tunnelling must be disabled on devices supporting this functionality when accessing an
organisational system via a Virtual Private Network.
Remote tracking, locking and wiping
Remote tracking helps to recover a device that has been lost or stolen.
Remote locking and wiping helps to protect organisational data on a device that has been lost, stolen, or de‐provisioned
including when the employee ceases employment.
Additional information
The consequences of wiping an employee’s personal data can be reduced by educating employees to regularly backup
their personal data or by using managed separation to avoid wiping personal data in the first place.
Attempting to remotely track, lock or wipe a device that is not network accessible will fail. For example, remote wipe
functionality is circumvented if the thief configures the device for aeroplane mode, which can easily be done from the
locked screen of some devices such as a Nexus 7 tablet running Android version 4.2.2 Jelly Bean.
Successfully remotely wiping a device provides the organisation with a false sense of security if the data has already
been accessed or copied by the person who found or stole the device.
Low privileged corporate user accounts
Using corporate user accounts with reduced privileges and limited access to sensitive data helps mitigate an adversary
accessing sensitive data by using compromised employee corporate account credentials or a compromised device.
Additional information
ASD’s ISM advises that privileged accounts should not be allowed to remotely access organisational systems containing
unclassified FOUO/Sensitive data or PROTECTED data.
Provide a secondary corporate user account, which has reduced privileges and limited access to sensitive data, to
employees who either:
26
have administrative privileges
have access to significant amounts of sensitive organisational data
are at higher risk, for example due to temporarily travelling overseas 31 – such employees might temporarily use a
separate corporately provided device.
Network architecture control access to organisational data and systems
Network Access Control helps to implement contextual security to determine if an employee attempting to access
organisational data should be permitted based on:
the device’s security posture as determined by endpoint compliance checking, including the degree to which the
device is corporately managed
the employee’s identity and the strength of authentication used to prove their identity
the sensitivity of the data being accessed
the destination of the data, for example whether data is to be stored on the device or shared via corporately
managed enterprise cloud storage
the employee’s network connectivity, for example whether the employee’s device is connecting using the
organisation’s Wi‐Fi network or an external less trusted network connection
the geographic location of the employee and the device
the time and day of the week.
Devices that don’t comply with security policy can be quarantined to have limited Internet access but no access to
organisational systems.
Devices simultaneously connecting to the organisation’s network and an additional network via 3G/4G or Wi‐can bridge
the two networks thereby creating an additional Internet gateway on the organisational network. Risk management
controls to help mitigate this include:
using Mobile Device Management to configure devices on organisational premises to either force all device traffic
to an organisational Virtual Private Network endpoint, or to turn off a device’s 3G/4G data connectivity while still
allowing phone calls
organisations setting up a custom Access Point Name to control data sent from devices via 3G/4G
forcing devices to use the organisation’s gateway to connect to the organisational network – this also assists the
organisation to use existing gateway mechanisms for logging, auditing, and filtering malicious or otherwise
undesirable network traffic.
The network flow of sensitive data to devices can be limited by using mechanisms such as Enterprise Rights
Management or Data Loss Prevention solutions, for example to prevent a device downloading an email from the
organisation’s email server if the email or attachment contains specific keywords indicating sensitive data.
Operating system exploit mitigation mechanisms
Limit devices on the shortlist to those devices with operating system exploit mitigation mechanisms such as:
Address Space Layout Randomisation 32
Data Execution Prevention
31
32
http://www.dsd.gov.au/publications/csocprotect/electronic_devices_os_travel.htm
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2012/07/20/android_jelly_bean_security_revamp/
27
applications and patches that are cryptographically signed by a trusted authority
application sandboxing to compartmentalise applications, restrict their ability to access data stored on the device,
and restrict applications interacting with other applications or the operating system.
User-reliant risk management controls
The following technical controls and policy controls to manage risk rely on employees complying with policy.
Regular backups of work data
Obtain written employee agreement to regularly backup work‐related data created or modified by their device, only to
backup servers specified by the organisation. This helps mitigate an employee’s work being lost due to sudden
cessation of employment or their device being damaged, lost or stolen.
Access to email, files and other data of archival significance
Obtain written employee agreement to ensure that work‐related data of archival significance is accessible to the
organisation. This involves employees using their work email account instead of their consumer grade webmail
account, and using corporately managed file storage instead of storing files locally or in consumer grade cloud storage.
This helps mitigate:
non‐compliance with legislation such as the Archives Act 1983
corporate knowledge being lost when the employee departs the organisation
the organisation being unable to properly perform security investigations, or perform electronic discovery for
litigation cases or freedom of information requests.
Avoid unauthorised cloud services for data backup, storage and sharing
Obtain written employee agreement to avoid exposing sensitive data to consumer grade cloud services used for
webmail, data backup, data storage or data sharing.
Additional information
Some consumer grade cloud storage and sharing services automatically sync between an employee’s devices
potentially copying sensitive data to a device that has not been approved to handle such data.
To facilitate the authorised exchange of data between devices, the organisation might need to arrange employee
access to a corporately managed and remotely accessible file storage and sharing capability, hosted in‐house or by a
trusted third party33 34.
Strong passphrase configuration settings
Obtain written employee agreement to use strong passphrases and associated configuration settings.
Obtain written employee agreement to avoid configuring their device’s operating system or applications to remember
organisational authentication credentials such as corporate passphrases used to access organisational systems.
33
34
http://www.dsd.gov.au/infosec/cloudsecurity.htm
http://agimo.gov.au/policy‐guides‐procurement/cloud/
28
Additional information
Recommended device configuration settings, based on the sensitivity of data being accessed or stored, are provided by
ASD’s ISM, device consumer guides and device hardening guides. ASD’s iOS Hardening Configuration Guide 35 advises
the following configuration settings for iOS devices that access or store PROTECTED data:
passphrases require a minimum of eight characters including alphanumeric characters
devices automatically lock their screen after five minutes of inactivity
a passphrase is always required to unlock the device – there is no grace period enabling a device to be unlocked
without a passphrase if the screen lock activated recently
devices are automatically wiped after five failed passphrase attempts, noting the risk of devices being accidentally
wiped especially if employees allow their device to be played with by children
passphrases have a maximum age of 90 days
the previous eight passphrases are unable to be reused.
Security incident reporting and investigation
Obtain written employee agreement to immediately report security incidents and cooperate with security and legal
investigations including providing the organisation with access to their device for forensic analysis.
Additional information
ASD’s ISM advises that employees must be directed to report security incidents to the organisation as soon as possible.
Security incidents requiring reporting include a device suspected of being infected with malware or otherwise
compromised, as well as device loss or theft. Additional activities, whilst not necessarily considered to be security
incidents, that need be reported by the employee to the organisation include de‐provisioning a device for sale or
passing to a family member, or if the employee ceases employment.
An organisation’s cyber security team requires plans and procedures to respond to security incidents, for example
disabling and monitoring the employee’s organisational accounts including Virtual Private Network and remote access
accounts, as well as remotely tracking the device and wiping organisational data if appropriate.
Organisations permitting the use of personally owned devices are accepting the residual risks of their use, such as any
potential security incidents or consequences of legal proceedings including electronic discovery for litigation cases and
freedom of information requests. Therefore, organisations need to ensure that they have risk management controls to
prevent and respond to security incidents and legal investigations. Organisations should not assume that ASD or CERT
Australia have the legal authority and resources to assist with performing incident response or forensic analysis that
involves personally owned devices.
A security or legal investigation might require an employee to temporarily surrender their device, which the employee
might refuse unless required by law, for example due to law enforcement having evidence of a crime to warrant seizing
the device. Organisations performing appropriate logging and regular backups of work‐related emails and files assists
with electronic discovery or other investigations involving employees who refuse to cooperate or who have departed
the organisation.
35
http://www.dsd.gov.au/publications/iOS5_Hardening_Guide.pdf
29
Avoid jailbreaking and rooting
Obtain written employee agreement to avoid jailbreaking or rooting their device to circumvent the protective security
controls implemented by the device’s vendor, which might result in the device being unmanageable by the organisation
and easily compromised.
Employee education to avoid physical connectivity with untrusted outlets or devices
Educate employees to avoid allowing connectivity between their device and either a potentially malicious charging
outlet36 or an untrusted device37.
Employee education about Bluetooth, Near Field Communication and Quick Response codes
Educate employees to avoid:
pairing with an unintended or insecure Bluetooth device
exchanging data with an untrusted Near Field Communication (NFC) device38
scanning NFC tags39 or Quick Response (QR) codes40 that are untrustworthy and potentially malicious.
Additional information
ASD’s ISM advises that devices storing or accessing unclassified FOUO/Sensitive data or classified data:
must be configured to remain undiscoverable to all other Bluetooth devices except during pairing
must only connect to the intended Bluetooth device during pairing
must be configured to avoid supporting multiple simultaneous Bluetooth headset connections
must use Bluetooth version 2.1 or later due to the introduction of secure simple pairing and extended inquiry
response which facilitates secure pairing with the desired device – a device’s Bluetooth version can be determined
by reading the product’s specifications or by using the Linux btscanner program.
Employee education to avoid installing potentially malicious applications
Educate employees using devices that have an official application marketplace to:
only install applications from the organisation’s enterprise application store or from official application
marketplaces such as Apple’s App Store, Google Play, Microsoft’s Windows Store, Microsoft’s Windows Phone
Store or BlackBerry World
prior to installing or updating an application, determine the risk of exposing sensitive data by reading user ratings,
user reviews and the application’s requested permissions to ensure that they align with the application’s stated
functionality41 42 – noting that such analysis is not guaranteed to avoid malware 43.
36
http://krebsonsecurity.com/2011/08/beware‐of‐juice‐jacking/
http://www.dsd.gov.au/videos/cybersense1.htm
38
http://www.zdnet.com/exploit‐beamed‐via‐nfc‐to‐hack‐samsung‐galaxy‐s3‐android‐4‐0‐4‐7000004510/
39
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2012/09/25/samsung_flaw/
40
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2012/12/10/qr_code_sticker_scam/
41
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2013/03/04/android_app_google_play_fraud/
42
http://www.securelist.com/en/blog/845/Hello_from_Malaysia
43
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2013/04/22/android_malware_badnews/
37
30
Educate employees using devices that don’t have an official marketplace to obtain software from the official website of
mainstream vendors.
Employee education to avoid being victims of shoulder surfing
Educate employees to avoid sensitive data on their device’s screen being visible to either:
people without the appropriate security clearance and need to know 44
surveillance video cameras45 46
members of the public
anyone, including family members, who are not authorised to see sensitive data.
Additional information
Using a privacy filter on a device’s screen might negatively impact the device’s touch functionality.
Employee education to avoid common intrusion vectors
Educate employees to avoid:
sharing their device with unauthorised people who are able to access and expose sensitive data
sending or receiving unencrypted sensitive data using an untrustworthy Wi‐Fi access point, such as a public Wi‐Fi
access point or any Wi‐Fi access point that isn’t owned by the organisation
leaving their device in insecure locations such as an unattended car, checked‐in airplane luggage, or a hotel safe
especially in a foreign country
interacting with emails and SMS messages from suspicious or unfamiliar sources, for example clicking on
hyperlinks or email attachments
selecting weak passphrases
reusing the same passphrase for multiple systems
unnecessarily exposing their work email address and personal details on publicly accessible websites.
Additional information
ASD’s ISM advises that all personnel who have access to an organisational system must have sufficient information
security awareness and training including an awareness of the social engineering threat.
Security patches
Obtain written employee agreement to apply all vendor security patches for the operating system and applications as
soon as patches are available from the vendor.
44
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2012/08/16/shoulder_surfing_security_risk/
http://www.engadget.com/2011/07/15/automated‐shoulder‐surfing‐makes‐it‐easier‐to‐steal‐passwords‐i/
46
http://arstechnica.com/security/2013/02/at‐facebook‐zero‐day‐exploits‐backdoor‐code‐bring‐war‐games‐drill‐to‐
life/2/
45
31
Additional information
ASD’s ISM advises that mobile devices permitted to access unclassified FOUO/Sensitive data or classified data should
have security updates applied as soon as vendor patches become available.
Historically, Apple has provided iOS devices with security patches for at least two years from device availability,
enabling employees to use devices supported with patches for the duration of their contract with their
telecommunications carrier.
Microsoft has stated that for Windows Phone 8, they will support every device with over the air updates for at least 18
months from the launch of that device47 though the availability of updates will vary 48. Microsoft’s lifecycle policy for
Windows RT, including the support time period for security updates, is to be communicated when available 49.
It is comparatively straightforward to apply security patches to some Android devices that don’t have third party
additions or modifications to baseline Android code50. However, applying security patches to other Android devices
might be challenging due to the cooperation required from the device’s hardware manufacturer and the employee’s
telecommunications carrier to tweak, test and distribute updates. Some hardware manufacturers and
telecommunications carriers might focus their efforts on developing and selling newer devices rather than maintaining
the security of the employee’s current device, even if the employee is forced to continue using their current device due
to a contract with the telecommunications carrier51. Some devices are immediately orphaned and never receive
updates52. In addition to vulnerabilities in baseline Android code, some vulnerabilities are introduced by device
hardware manufacturers53 54 55.
Some cheaper Android devices have the bare minimum hardware specifications required to run the version of the
operating system shipped with the device, and might not be suited to running newer major versions of the operating
system that require additional memory or processing power. Patching vulnerabilities in the operating system running
on such devices might be challenging for patches that are only available in newer major versions of the operating
system and are not backported to current and previous operating system versions.
Case study
In 2012, an ASD employee purchased a brand new Android smartphone. The employee subsequently discovered that
on the day the smartphone was sold, it contained a vulnerability that at the time had been publicly known for over
seven months. The smartphone’s hardware manufacturer and the employee’s telecommunications carrier did not
make a patch available.
To demonstrate a targeted intrusion, the smartphone was deliberately compromised by exploiting this vulnerability.
The compromise enabled the microphone to be surreptitiously turned on to record nearby audio conversations and
the recordings to be transmitted to an adversary over the Internet.
This demonstration highlighted some consequences of organisations permitting the use of devices with publicly
known vulnerabilities that the employee is unable to patch. As of May 2013, over 18 months after the vulnerability
was publicly disclosed, a patch hasn’t been made available via the hardware manufacturer and telecommunications
carrier.
47
http://channel9.msdn.com/Events/Windows‐Phone/Summit/Updates‐Apps‐and‐closing‐remarks
http://support.microsoft.com/lifecycle/search/default.aspx?alpha=windows+phone
49
http://support.microsoft.com/gp/lifecycle‐windows‐rt‐faq
50
http://support.google.com/googleplay/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=2589788
51
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/02/carriers‐fail‐to‐secure‐phones/
52
http://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2012/12/the‐checkered‐slow‐history‐of‐android‐handset‐updates/
53
http://threatpost.com/htc‐settlement‐could‐alter‐mobile‐security‐and‐privacy‐landscape‐022513/
54
http://threatpost.com/vulnerabilities‐continue‐weigh‐down‐samsung‐android‐phones‐032013/
55
http://www.zdnet.com/kernel‐vulnerability‐places‐samsung‐devices‐at‐risk‐7000008862/
48
32
Ownership of Intellectual Property and copyright
Obtain written employee agreement that the organisation retains ownership of intellectual property and copyright of
work performed on a formally assigned task that the employee is paid to perform, regardless of whether the employee
performs the work on their device or outside of traditional business hours.
Encryption of data at rest
Obtain written employee agreement to use full device encryption to help mitigate organisational data being accessed
by an adversary who has physical access to a lost or stolen device.
Additional information
ASD’s ISM advises that devices without ASD approved encryption should not store unclassified FOUO/Sensitive data
and must not store classified data.
ASD’s ISM advises that ASD approved encryption should be used to encrypt a device’s internal storage and any
removable media.
Full device encryption doesn’t limit which applications can access or spread organisational data stored on the device.
Therefore, its effectiveness relies upon the use of additional complementary risk management controls.
Encryption needs to be active when the device is not in use. Depending on the type of device, the effectiveness of
encrypting a device’s internal storage might be reduced if the device is lost or stolen while it is in sleep mode or
powered on and screen locked.
Using software‐based encryption might negatively impact the employee’s user experience.
Microsoft has stated that Windows Phone 8 has full internal storage encryption, and that although removable media
such as SD cards are not encrypted, they are only able to store music, videos, photos and e‐books 56.
Apple’s iPad, iPhone 3GS and later models use hardware‐based cryptographic acceleration for protecting data.
BlackBerry devices support native encryption of internal storage57 and removable media58.
Android version 3 Honeycomb introduced full device encryption 59, though depending on a device’s manufacturer, third
party software might be required to encrypt removable media 60.
Cryptographic implementations that have not been evaluated by ASD are unsuitable for protecting classified Australian
government data.
Avoid printing via untrusted systems
Obtain written employee agreement to avoid printing sensitive data via untrusted printers outside of the office such as
from home, an airline lounge, a hotel or an Internet café. Otherwise, sensitive data might be exposed to third parties
due to printers or print servers storing a cached copy of printouts, or printouts being accidentally left on the printer.
56
http://www.zdnet.com/windows‐phone‐8‐a‐tour‐of‐the‐business‐features‐7000006600/
http://www.dsd.gov.au/infosec/epl/view_document.php?document_id=OTA4IyMjMjAzLjYuNjkuMg==
58
http://docs.blackberry.com/en/smartphone_users/deliverables/39933/1812724.jsp
59
http://source.android.com/tech/encryption/android_crypto_implementation.html
60
http://code.google.com/p/android/issues/detail?id=11211
57
33
Personal firewall
Obtain written employee agreement to use a personal firewall to help mitigate devices becoming compromised, by
limiting the exposure of network accessible services and controlling which applications can access the network.
Additional information
This risk management control is not applicable to some devices, such as those running iOS, that don’t expose personal
firewall functionality and avoid using network accessible services. Some devices, such as those running Android, use an
inbuilt application permission mechanism to control which applications are able to access the network.
34
Appendix D: Corporately approved and managed
devices for highly sensitive data
This appendix provides guidance to manage risks associated with Scenario D. This scenario involves devices with a
hardware model and operating system version that:
is chosen by the employee from a corporately approved shortlist
has comprehensive risk management controls applied
is completely corporately managed, for example using ASD evaluated BlackBerry Enterprise Server or Apple
Configuration Profiles combined with Supervised Mode
potentially includes corporately managed separation of organisational data and personal data, for example using
remote virtual desktop software, a managed container or partitioning functionality built into the operating
system
uses a corporately managed mechanism to access and potentially store highly sensitive data, for example using
remote virtual desktop software or corporately approved native applications combined with a Virtual Private
Network.
For Australian government agencies, highly sensitive data is defined for the purpose of this document as data up to
PROTECTED.
The comprehensive risk management controls might restrict the device’s functionality to an extent that would overly
frustrate an employee using a personally owned device. Therefore, devices in this scenario might be provided to
employees by the organisation, with a reasonable degree of personal use permitted. Devices on the shortlist might be
limited to smartphones and tablets that are part of a single vendor’s ecosystem due to the required compatibility with
risk management controls. Organisations might retain ownership of devices for legal reasons that facilitate the
organisation monitoring devices, remotely wiping sensitive data, performing security and legal investigations, and
retaining ownership of intellectual property. Enabling employees to choose a device from a corporately approved
shortlist is referred to by some vendors as Choose Your Own Device, especially if the device is purchased, owned and
managed by the organisation.
This appendix builds upon and incorporates the high level objectives and risk management controls discussed in
Appendix C which covers devices from a corporately approved shortlist using a corporately managed mechanism to
access and potentially store sensitive data. Risk management controls in Appendix C that an organisation considers
unnecessary to protect sensitive data are likely to be necessary to protect highly sensitive data. High level objectives
associated with the example scenario in Appendix D also include maintaining the confidentiality of highly sensitive data.
Corporately enforced risk management controls
The organisation is able to manage risk by enforcing the following technical controls.
Device selection
Limit devices on the corporately approved shortlist to those devices that are evaluated by ASD and are configured as
per ASD’s consumer guides and device hardening guides. Prefer devices that have an application marketplace with a
good history of curation to exclude malware, for example by analysing applications for suspicious behaviour, requiring
applications to be cryptographically signed by a trusted authority instead of a self‐signed certificate, and performing
adequate verification of the identity of application developers.
35
Mobile Application Management and enterprise application stores
Mobile Application Management enables the organisation to inventory, install, update and remove applications and
associated data on devices.
Using an enterprise application store enables the organisation to distribute and manage applications developed by the
organisation, and vet third party applications to determine their potential to expose highly sensitive data.
Additional information
ASD’s ISM advises that employees should be prevented from installing unapproved applications that can access
unclassified FOUO/Sensitive data or classified data.
The use of Mobile Application Management and enterprise application stores is a more reliable approach to avoiding
the use of applications that might expose highly sensitive data, than simply relying on anti‐malware software and
employees to read user reviews and ratings before installing or updating applications. Whitelisting permitted
applications and updated versions of these applications, or less preferably attempting to identify and blacklist every
malicious or undesirable application, helps mitigate devices running applications that either:
are potentially malicious, undesirable, or not approved by the organisation
have the potential to expose highly sensitive data – this includes adware and potentially unwanted applications
that collect data from devices as part of the application’s revenue model
have undesirable interactions with other applications, for example using the ‘Open In...’ feature to open a highly
sensitive email attachment in a consumer grade cloud storage application.
Some vendor implementations of Mobile Application Management also include functionality to effectively place an
application into its own managed container by wrapping it with security policy. Such security policies include:
requiring a passphrase to be entered before an application will run
enforcing encryption of an application’s stored data
requiring a Virtual Private Network connection to encrypt an application’s data in transit
limiting an application’s ability to copy and paste data.
Mobile Application Management might not be able to block powerful web applications that are written in HTML5 and
run within the web browser.
36
